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 II 
Abstract 
 
Policy processes within the EU are complex and time consuming. Swift responses to 
ever changing challenges as well as compliance to rules and regulations are crucial for 
the functioning of the EU. This thesis deals with the obligation of member states (MS) 
to comply with decisions made at the supranational level. The thesis specifically 
analyses whether conflict between political actors influence compliance with EU 
directives in Sweden. This situates the thesis in on-going scholarly debates on reasons 
for variation in non-compliance between policy sectors. 
 
The thesis analyses 56 strategically selected transposition processes, using text analysis 
to test a series of hypotheses regarding political conflict and compliance. The thesis 
moreover analyses 15 cases in-depth to try and establish a causal link between political 
conflict and non-compliance. The analysis furthermore aims to test whether, a well-
established proxy for political conflict in quantitative studies, the divide between 
council and commission directives, holds when tested qualitatively. 
 
The thesis concludes that council directives do cause a lot more conflict in Sweden than 
commission directives. Furthermore the thesis finds that political conflict seems to have 
a substantial effect on compliance in the Swedish context and thus with some certainty 
in other EU MSs as well. The result corroborates conclusions from previous scholarly 
work, that political processes in the MSs are an important key for the understanding of 
compliance variance. However when putting the mechanisms to a test of in depth 
analysis the thesis fails in establishing a causal link between political conflict and 
compliance failures.  
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Transposition, Europeanization, International relations,  
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1 Introducing	  the	  thesis	  
1.1 Introduction	  	  
The European Union (EU) is a multi-level political system where all policy processes are 
shaped and influenced by numerous actors. Such actors include inter alia supranational 
institutions – e.g. the European Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) – Member State (MS) governments and parliaments, subnational 
governments, as well as non-state actors. This makes policy processes within the EU complex 
and time consuming. However, swift policy responses to ever changing challenges as well as 
compliance1 to rules and regulations are crucial for the functioning of the EU.   
 
European leaders are often accused of acting too slow on emerging issues and MS politicians 
are correspondingly accused of not adapting its policies to decisions made at the supranational 
level. Thus it is of utmost importance for society to gain knowledge in how to handle the 
complex environment of EU politics in order to increase the efficiency, legitimacy and 
adaptability of the EU.  
 
Policy processes include at least three stages2: policy formulation (agenda setting), decision-
making and implementation (e.g. Versluis et al 2011; Jordan & Adelle 2013). All these stages 
must function effectively for a policy to reach its objectives. While there is a vast body, and a 
long tradition, of research on policy formulation and decision-making processes in the EU, 
scholarly debates on what happens after decisions are made have picked up only during the 
last 25 years (Dimitrova & Steunenberg 2014; Treib 2014). With a slow start, the field has 
grown parallel to the increasing amount of EU legislation, and the evolution of European 
integration. 
                                                
1 The concept compliance is central to this thesis and will be discussed further in section 3.1.1. Compliance is defined as an 
instance when a MS has implemented a EU policy and hence complies with the intentions of that policy. Non-compliance on 
the other hand is a moment when a policy should have been implemented but is not. Compliance is closely related to the 
concept implementation – the process of transferring political decisions into outcomes. Hence compliance refers to the 
successful result of an implementation process. While scholarly work on compliance often is labelled either compliance 
studies or implementation studies interchangeably, the term compliance studies is used throughout the thesis. However, 
implementation is used when referring to the process rather than the outcome.  
2 While further stages such as policy coordination and evaluation often are included (e.g. Jordan & Adelle 2013) 
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Compliance with policies is important in all political systems to reach intended objectives. 
However, compliance faces even more challenges, and is arguably more important within the 
context of the EU. Some commentators go as far as stating that:  
 
“The moment its rules and regulations cease to be implemented, the EU ceases to exist.” 
(Toshkov 2012: 2).  
 
Even though there might be reasons to contest and qualify such statements it underlines the 
importance of compliance as well as potent enforcement mechanisms in a multi-level political 
system such as the EU.  
 
Albeit the amount of academic literature on compliance has arguably exploded over the last 
two decades, there is a patchwork of gaps to be filled with further research. This thesis seeks 
to fill some of these gaps by contributing to the understanding of which factors that enables 
and impedes compliance with EU policy. The direction for the focus of the study is set by two 
recent developments in compliance research: (1) an increasing focus on policy sector variance 
in compliance (see section 2.2) and (2) the critique directed at quantitative measurements of 
compliance and explanatory variables (see section 2.1.1).  
1.2 Aim	  and	  research	  questions	  
As is demonstrated by the introduction and sections below, compliance is an important issue, 
for society at large as well as for social sciences in general and European Studies in particular. 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to both societal and scholarly discussions on how to 
improve the efficiency and legitimacy of the EU. It does so by analysing transposition3 
processes in order to find out what cause compliance failures in the MSs of the EU.  
 
Most research in the field of EU compliance has developed from either policy implementation 
or international relations (IR) perspectives (Treib 2014; Mastenbroek 2005). Thus most 
factors for non-compliance have been sought to explain cross-national variation in 
compliance patterns. Recent research efforts have however underlined the importance to 
                                                
3 Transposition is, as compliance, a central concept of the thesis and is further discussed in section 3.1. Transposition refers 
to the process of making national law, which implements the content and aim of a directive. Correct and timely Transposition 
is thus the prerequisite for formal/legal compliance (see section 3.1.1).  
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analyse variance in compliance between different policy-sectors rather than between 
countries. This interest has been spurred by theoretical developments in the field as well as 
the deepening of European integration. The line of research is in its infancy and much more 
needs to be done to fill in the blanks regarding how and why policies in some sectors are less 
often complied with compared to other policy fields (Haverland et al 2011; Börzel & Knoll 
2014). Thus this thesis aims to make a contribution to on-going scholarly debates regarding 
compliance variance between policy-sectors in the EU. Accordingly the overarching research 
question that this thesis seeks to inform is: 
 
• How and why does (non-) compliance with EU-legislation vary between policy-sectors? 
 
The research question in its entirety obviously cannot be answered within the scope of this 
thesis, given the case selection4. This thesis answers hypotheses derived from previous 
research and theory thereby contributing to a part of the answer for the full question.  
 
The thesis focus and main independent variable is political conflict. As a factor it is proposed 
to influence compliance records negatively by numerous scholars, including those who 
highlight sector variance (e.g. Steunenberg & Rhinard 2010; Haverland et al 2011; Börzel & 
Knoll 2014). The rationale behind the theorised effect of this variable is that political actors, 
who disagree with a directive, can prolong and/or distort the transposition, causing delayed 
and/or inadequate compliance.  
 
As quantitative studies have been increasingly common in research on EU compliance – not 
least amongst scholars interested in policy sector variance – new data and methods have been 
used (Toshkov 2010; Angelova et al 2012). Concurrently however there have been concerns 
raised regarding the validity of dependent as well as independent variables in quantitative 
research programs5 (Hartlapp & Falkner 2009; Börzel 2001). Therefore there are serious 
doubts whether inferences in quantitative studies are valid and can be used to conclude 
anything “about the size or about the shape” of compliance and non-compliance with EU 
policies (Hartlapp & Falkner 2009: 292). Hence the thesis aims to qualitatively test 
hypotheses supported in quantitative studies on compliance, to evaluate whether previous 
                                                
4 See section 4 on research design, methods and case selection 
5 See section 2.1.1  
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results are caused by invalid operationalisation or not. The final aim of the thesis is to test if 
established proxies for independent variables holds when analysed qualitatively.  
 
An established proxy for political conflict over directives is the division between directives 
adopted by the council or by the commission (e.g. Haverland et al 2011; Börzel & Knoll 
2014). When analysing the effect of political conflict the thesis also tests if this division 
accurately depicts political conflict in the transposition process. 
 
As will be explained at length in the methods section below (section 4.2) the scope of the 
thesis has been further limited to one country (Sweden) and three policy-sectors (Agriculture, 
Enterprise and Finance). The context specific sub-questions in this thesis are thus: 
 
1) To what extent does the division between commission and council directives serve as a 
good proxy for the level of political conflict over directives? 
2) How is correct and timely transposition in Agriculture, Finance and Enterprise 
affected by political conflict over directives in Sweden? 
1.3 Outline	  
This thesis consists of six sections. The first of these introduces the thesis by summarising its 
societal and scholarly background, presenting the aim and research questions and finally by 
outlining the content of upcoming sections.  
 
The second section of the thesis goes further in mapping current research efforts on 
compliance in the EU. The section starts by outlining the theoretical and methodological 
evolution of the research field, since its novel attempts in late 1980s until the present state of 
the art. The second half of the section proceeds by digging deeper into some of the empirical 
findings in previous research. These parts are separated to underline the situation of the thesis 
as a contribution to theoretical and methodological debates as well as to the body of empirical 
knowledge. The section on previous research ends by highlighting gaps in the existing 
literature and thus directions for further research. 
 
The third section of the thesis elaborates the theoretical assumptions that guide the study. It 
does so by explaining key concepts such as compliance, transposition and political conflict 
more thoroughly. The section provides an explanation of the division between preference- and 
  5 
capacity-based factors that are supposed to cause compliance failures. This part of the thesis 
also provides detail on how and why commission directives are expected to cause less 
political conflict than council directives, and presents the main hypotheses of the thesis. The 
theory section also presents the thesis main explanatory model, explicitly and graphically.  
 
The research design, methods and empirical material used for the empirical analysis are 
presented in the fourth section of the thesis. Possible advantages and pitfalls of the chosen 
methodology are also discussed. The section introduces the data used in the thesis and 
outlines the case selection done within its scope. Operationalisation of the main variables of 
the thesis is also introduced as part of these methodological discussions.  
 
The empirical material is analysed in section five starting with a division between different 
methods for transposition and a presentation of the 56 analysed directives and their respective 
transposition into Swedish law. The empirical analysis reveal that there is a relation between 
the type of directive and political conflict as well as between political conflict and 
transposition failures. However while this strengthens the hypotheses of the thesis, contrary 
evidence is also found. The second half of the empirical analysis deals in more detail with 15 
strategically chosen directives to try and causally connect political conflict to transposition 
failures. While some evidence is found that increases the likelihood for a causal relationship it 
is not confirmed within the analysis of this thesis.  
 
The results of the empirical analysis are discussed in relation to the aim and research 
questions, alternative explanations and the body of previous research in the sixth section of 
the thesis. It is in this section that all previous sections are tied together to chisel out the final 
contribution to the scholarly debate on EU compliance. This final section of the study also 
summarises the main conclusions of the thesis and points towards possible directions for 
future research. As thus this section concludes that council directives cause a lot more conflict 
in the MSs than commission directives. Furthermore the thesis finds that political conflict 
seems to have a substantial effect on compliance in the Swedish context and thus with some 
certainty in other EU countries as well. However when putting the mechanisms to a test, of in 
depth analysis, the thesis fails to establish a causal link between political conflict and the 
dependent variable of the thesis, compliance.  
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2 Previous	  research	  
Since the late 1980s there has been a growing scholarly interest in, compliance with EU 
policy (Treib 2014). This have been spurred by an increasing body of EU legislation and the 
realisation that EU policies need to be applied correct to have the desired effects.  
 
The search for relevant literature in the work with this thesis was performed in a series of 
steps. Initially the search engines Google Scholar and the Web of Science where accessed to 
find relevant literature using search phrases such as “Compliance European Union”, 
“Implementation EU” and  “Compliance EU law”. The selection of material to analyse further 
was conducted using three principles. The focus was: (1) research suggesting general models 
for explaining compliance variance, (2) work published in the 2000s and onwards, (3) 
research approximating the relationship between policy sectors and compliance. However 
other research have also been considered, notably old seminal research (e.g. Siedentopf & 
Ziller 1988; Haas 1998; Tallberg 1998), more recent context dependent studies (e.g. Versluis 
2007; Dimitrova & Steunenberg 2014) and pivotal studies looking at variance between 
countries (e.g. Haverland 2010; Falkner et al 2005; Mbaye 2001; Börzel et al 2010). 
Furthermore literature reviews and meta-analyses of the research field have been used to 
identify further scholarly works of interest for the thesis6. 
2.1 Theoretical	  and	  methodological	  evolution	  of	  the	  research-­‐field	  
Reviews of the existing literature usually divide the scholarship on EU compliance in 
different phases (Treib 2014; Mastenbroek 2005). The section below builds on the division, 
into four research waves, presented by Oliver Treib (2014) that is summarised in table 1 
below. Even though the waves are described as chronologically ordered, as well as 
theoretically and empirically separated it is evident that all four waves partly coexists. The 
division is thus illustrative to sort different theoretical and methodological schools rather than 
as an outline of strictly (historically and conceptually) separated research traditions (Treib 
2014).  
 
According to Treib the first wave of research was inspired by national implementation 
scholars and treated implementation of EU policies “as a rather apolitical process” where 
                                                
6 Notably: Treib (2014), Mastenbroek (2005), Angelova et al (2012), Toshkov (2011), Toshkov (2010) and Toshkov et al 
(2010). 
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issues such as administrative and legislative efficiency where in focus (Treib 2014: 7). With 
its main inspiration from top-down scholarship the first wave found most of its explanations 
in how policies where formulated and in the administrative capacity of national governments. 
However, bottom-up perspectives inspired first-wave scholars to underline the importance of 
including all actors in policy-making as well as implementation (Treib 2014).  
 
Table 1: The evolution of theory and methods in EU compliance research 
  First Wave Second Wave Third Wave Fourth Wave 
Dominant 
Theoretical 
perspective(s) 
Implementation 
studies 
Historical 
institutionalism 
(Misfit) 
MS politics  
IR 
IR 
Implementation studies  
Methodology Qualitative Qualitative Qualitative 
Quantitative 
Qualitative 
Quantitative 
Focus Application  Application Transposition Application (enforcement) 
Transposition   
Unit of analysis Countries Countries Countries 
Directives 
(Sectors) 
Countries 
Directives 
Sectors 
 
In the second wave the focus where mainly set on the “misfit” theory according to which 
compliance failures is caused by: “the degree of [in] compatibility between EU policies and 
domestic structures” (Treib 2014: 8). This was inspired by theories of path-dependency within 
the tradition of historic institutionalism7. Resistance towards EU policy were thus mainly seen 
as resistance towards changes in the MS status quo (Treib 2014). It should be noted that the 
misfit hypothesis, repeatedly disproved by scholars, have been developed and refined 
throughout the history of EU compliance research (Mastenbroek 2005). It has drawn from a 
variety of theoretical perspectives such as neo-institutionalism and domestic policy change 
(Börzel 2000; Treib 2003). 
 
Moving from the second to the third wave there is a shift in focus regarding dependent 
variable in the majority of research efforts. In the first and second waves no clear distinction 
was made between transposition (legal/formal compliance) and application (practical 
                                                
7 Path-dependency and historic institutionalism will not be further presented in this thesis. For contemporaneous discussions 
see e.g. Immergut (1998) and Pierson (2000). For a recent attempt to use institutionalism in compliance studies see Berglund 
(et al 2006). 
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compliance). Hence Treib (2014: 8) argues that first and second-wave scholarship “covered 
transposition as well as application and enforcement”. However while a conceptual 
understanding of implementation as a stepwise process emerged in the two latter waves, 
where transposition and enforcement/application are separated, studies on 
enforcement/application became scarce. Even though there are exceptions (e.g. Falkner et al 
2005; Versluis 2007), application and enforcement rarely is the explicit object of EU 
compliance studies (Versluis 2007; Toshkov 2011).  
 
Treibs (2014) third wave housed two additional developments: a growing number of 
quantitative studies and an increasing focus on MS politics. While qualitative scholars 
underlined the importance of policy actors´ preferences regarding EU policy, quantitative 
scholars focused on variation in administrative capacity and national cost and benefit 
calculations between countries (Treib 2014). Thus qualitative and quantitative scholars in the 
third wave illustrate the beginning of a divide between – the since then dominating theoretical 
perspectives derived from compliance research in IR – the enforcement and the management 
approach. 
 
The fourth wave of compliance research involves further distance between qualitative and 
quantitative scholars8. While qualitative work explores MSs´ relationship to the ECJ and its 
rulings, quantitative studies focus on transposition of directives introducing a novel focus, on 
not only MS factors but also EU level decision-making features that might affect transposition 
records (Treib 2014). Qualitative studies furthermore, to some extent, have accepted the 
challenge to research practical compliance while quantitative scholars have stayed with 
commission data on transposition and infringement procedures9 (Treib 2014).  
 
The qualitative shift in focus also reintroduces implementation studies as a theoretical 
starting-point for compliance scholars. This since administrative implementation processes for 
EU policy might be regarded as no different from other laws and regulations (e.g. Bourblanc 
et al 2013). However, while this conclusion seems reasonable enough there are scholars that 
underline the importance of IR perspectives – and other lessons learned in EU specific 
                                                
8 Even though some research programs have used mixed methods to attempt to overcome this gap, see e.g. Leutgert & 
Danwolf 2009. 
9 Which could be regarded as another measure of timely transposition rather than moving towards a quantitative proxy for 
compliance in a wider perspective (see section 2.1.1) 
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compliance research – for practical compliance as well (Treib 2014; Versluis 2007). Thus 
there are still good reasons to regard research on compliance in the EU as a field, partly 
separate from other scholarly work on implementation, where an eclectic use of theory 
persists10. 
2.1.1 A	  statistical	  artefact	  or	  an	  iceberg:	  methodological	  challenges	  	  
Parallel to the growing amount of quantitative studies in EU compliance research, there has 
been a fierce debate on the validity of these research efforts (e.g. Hartlapp & Falkner 2009; 
Börzel 2001; Falkner 2007; Toshkov 2011). The main reason for such concern is the 
operationalisation and data used in the quantitative studies.  
 
Most quantitative work on compliance in the EU is based on either one of two methods for 
measuring compliance. The studies use commission data on either notification of 
transposition measures or infringement procedures. While the former often are 
complemented by MS data when commission data is incomplete, the latter builds exclusively 
on information from the commission (Hartlapp & Falkner 2009; Treib 2014). The critique 
against these measurements is that they might be incomplete and biased (Hartlapp & Falkner 
2009; Falkner 2009).  
 
The MSs generates commission data on notification of transposition measures, due to their 
obligation to notify the commission about measures to transpose directives. There are two 
main doubts about the relevance of this data. First it only depicts timelines for transposition 
and not correctness. Second, since notification data are built on MSs´ own notifications it can 
be systematically biased because of strategic choice as well as MS capacity (to notify) 
(Hartlapp & Falkner 2009). There is furthermore no agreement on whether it is the timeline of 
the first or last notified transposing measure that is most relevant as a comparative measure 
(Haverland et al 2011; König & Leutgert 2009). Thus data on notification depicts only part of 
the transposition process and certainly not practical compliance. It is furthermore skewed by 
choices and capacities in MS administrations.  
 
The first disadvantage with notification data is one reason to use infringement data instead. 
Since the commission opens infringement procedures in case of (perceived) non-compliance, 
                                                
10 Suggested by Mastenbroek (2005) to be a trait of the first wave of EU compliance research  
  10 
these procedures should consider timelines as well as correctness. However studies have 
shown that most11 of the infringement procedures are opened against MSs because of failure 
to notify (Hartlapp & Falkner 2009). Thus infringements also seem to reveal not all but only 
part of compliance. This is underlined by the fact that the commission strategically chose 
which instances of non-compliance to pursue (with an infringement procedure) and that the 
capacity of the Directorate Generals differs in this regard (König & Mäder 2014; Hartlapp & 
Falkner 2009). Hence quantitative work with infringements as its data are studies on “the 
reaction to non-compliance on the part of the European Commission” rather than compliance 
itself (Hartlap & Falkner 2009:298). It depicts more of the transposition process than 
notification data but largely leaves out correctness as well as the aspect of practical 
compliance with EU law.  
 
The empirical implication of these measurement problems are eloquently described by 
Miriam Hartlapp and Gerda Falkner (2009:292): 
 
Put differently, this type of research looks only at the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of non-compliance. 
This entails two major problems: We do not know much either about the size or about the shape 
of those parts that remain below the waterline. 
2.2 Findings	  in	  previous	  research	  
The four waves of compliance research is a good illustration, of how scholars have been 
inspired by different theoretical perspectives, methodologies and focused on different units of 
analysis as well as parts of the implementation process. While the list is not exhaustive it 
covers the main developments within the field. This next section however goes a step further 
and outlines the central findings in this research.  
 
There have been several (recent) attempts to make meta-analyses on the body of EU 
compliance research. These analyses goes beyond traditional literature reviews, and argues 
systematically why there are good reasons to believe that some factors are relevant 
explanations of non-compliance and others are not (Toshkov 2011; 2010; et al 2010; 
Angelova et al 2012). However while each of these studies are convincing by themselves they 
                                                
11 About two-thirds according to Hartlapp & Falkner (2009:295). 
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end up with contradicting conclusions12. This illustrates that there is a wide array of possible 
factors and conflicting results present in the literature (Toshkov 2010; Angelova et al 2012).  
 
Even though much of EU compliance research is done separately from perspectives in IR, the 
divide between enforcement and management approaches illuminates the main division 
between groups of proposed explanatory factors for non-compliance in the field. Factors close 
to the management approach are caused by involuntary non-compliance and can be labelled 
capacity-based factors. Explanatory factors in line with enforcement perspectives on the other 
hand are caused by voluntary non-compliance and are labelled preference-based factors13 
(Treib 2014; Börzel et al 2010). Since there are a vast number of independent variables14 put 
forward by previous studies, the sections below will only present the most prominent 
variables, which are relevant for this study15.  
2.2.1 Capacity-­‐based	  factors	  
Capacity-based explanations of non-compliance start from the assumption that MSs aim to 
comply with EU policies. However all MSs might not have the capacity to do so. Capacity-
based explanations for non-compliance differ between decision-making and administrative 
capacity (Treib 2014).  
 
The reason why decision-making capacity is believed to influence transposition relies on the 
fact that EU policies need to be transposed into national law16. A government, willing to 
transpose a law, thus needs to possess the required capacity to make reality of necessary 
policy changes. Factors that are suggested, and find recurring empirical support, to have an 
impact on this capacity are number of veto-players, federalism, number of ministries involved, 
parliamentary scrutiny, and coordination strength (e.g. Toshkov et al 2010; Haverland 2010; 
Haverland & Romeijn 2007; Mbaye 2001; Börzel et al 2010). While veto-players, federalism 
and ministries involved seems to influence compliance negatively, parliamentary scrutiny and 
                                                
12 While Angelova et al (2012:1269) (e.g.) finds that: ”results on […] ‘administrative efficiency’ remain ambiguous” 
Toshkov (2010:35) concludes that administrative efficiency is one factor that ”almost certain affect compliance positively”. 
13 For an in-depth discussion on this division see section 3.2 in the theory section of the thesis. 
14 Toshkov (2010) finds that 263 potential variables have been tested by (his sample of) quantitative studies alone.  
15 The factors introduced in this section find recurring empirical support and/or has been suggested by many scholars. It also 
covers recent scholarly debates regarding sector variance.  
16 This is true for directives, which is the object of this thesis. Most compliance studies focuses on directives since it arguably 
is the most important legal act (Toshkov 2014).  
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coordination strength seems to make compliance better (Toshkov et al 2010). Regarding veto-
players however there are some studies that find an opposite relationship, which is suggested 
to have both methodological and theoretical explanations17 (Börzel et al 2010; Mbaye 2001). 
 
Two independent variables concerning administrative capacity that have been investigated 
and confirmed by numerous studies are bureaucratic efficiency and corruption levels (e.g. 
Mbaye 2001, Börzel et al 2010; Kaeding 2006; Toshkov et al 2010). The rationale behind 
these factors is that civil servants play an important role in transposition as well as in 
application. Thus the capacity of the administration matters for speed as well as correctness of 
compliance with EU policy. While Toshkov (2010) finds that there are recurring support for 
administrative capacities to matter for compliance, Angelova et al (2012) argues that this is 
true only across their selection of case studies (i.e. not in quantitative research). Angelova et 
al (2012) further argues that case-studies are biased towards confirming its´ hypotheses, 
which stresses that some caution is advised, regarding administrative capacity as an 
explanatory factor (Angelova et al 2012).  
2.2.2 Preference-­‐based	  factors	  
The preference-based factors put forward by research are based on the assumption that some 
actors (can) oppose compliance with EU-law, generally or in specific cases. Expressed in the 
language of the enforcement approach:  
 
States are conceived of as rational actors that weigh the costs and benefits of alternative 
behavioural choices when making compliance decisions in cooperative situations (Talberg 
2002: 611).  
 
While the IR perspective obviously focuses on states as the (only) relevant actor, other actors 
do have the possibility to block compliance. Hence while preference-based approaches from 
IR (enforcement) underlines the hesitance of governments to comply with decisions (Mbaye 
2001; Börzel et al 2010), other preference-based models focus on policy actors in the MSs 
(Steunenberg 2007; Dimitrova & Steunenberg 2014).  
 
Preference-based variables from IR have been thoroughly examined in the literature. The 
meta-analyses of EU compliance research, in this case, however reports a conclusion that is 
                                                
17 See Börzel (et al 2010:1381) on veto-players in consensus democracies 
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discouraging for those claiming that factors such as political bargaining power, economic 
strength and government/public opinion matters for compliance records (Toshkov 2010; 
Angelova et al 2012). While some scholars find support for the effect of bargaining power 
(e.g. Börzel et al 2010; Mbaye 2010) these are conflicting (varying from positive to negative) 
and accompanied by non-significant results (Haverland & Romeijn 2007). Economic strength 
fares quite differently depending on how it is operationalised and the opinion (on 
Europeanization) of the general public or governments do not seem to have a systematic 
impact on compliance (Toshkov 2010; Toshkov 2011; Angelova et al 2012). Much of these 
differences seem to be related to operationalisation, even though some theoretical arguments 
for (some of the) differing results are put forward (Hartlapp & Falkner 2009; Toshkov 2011). 
Thus we cannot conclude that the suggested IR preference factors have no effect, but rather 
needs to be further investigated with a focus on how to operationalize central variables. 
 
Variables in the literature that focuses on preferences by other actors than states (i.e. 
governments) include inter alia: organised interest (Börzel 2001), subnational authorities 
(Borghetto & Franchino 2010), civil servants (Dimitrova & Steunenberg 2014), political 
parties (Steunenberg 2007) and The European Commission (Steunenberg 2010; König & 
Mäder 2014). While “the jury is out” regarding whether non-state actors systematically 
influences compliance, these approaches has inspired more recent scholarly work on the 
arguably most persistent grand theory on compliance: The misfit hypothesis (Toshkov 
2011:12; e.g. Börzel 2003).  
2.2.3 The	  misfit	  theory	  revisited	  
While the third wave of compliance research developed partly as a response to the 
disappointing empirical record of the misfit hypothesis, most research kept the argument of 
the hypothesis in some form (Mastenbroek 2005). The original misfit hypothesis starts from 
the assumption that national governments are the guardians of the status quo thus resisting all 
policy that deviates (too much) from the rules and regulations of the MSs (Treib 2014). 
However, when bringing MS politics into the picture governments are quite obviously 
recognised as political actors that can resist as well as advocate policy change (e.g. Treib 
2003). Only when political actors, that gain from keeping the national status quo, can 
influence compliance decisions – be it through multiple veto-points, because of high levels of 
conflict or as currently being in government – the original misfit argument seems to hold 
(Mastenbroek 2005; Dimitrova & Steunenberg 2014; Treib 2003). Hence more recent 
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attempts to qualify the misfit hypothesis can be labelled political misfit where the fit between 
European policy and the preferences of relevant actors are in focus (Mastenbroek 2005). 
2.2.4 Recent	  developments	  and	  novel	  attempts	  
There has been a growing amount of evidence in EU compliance studies that compliance not 
only differ between countries, but also systematically between different policy sectors 
(Tallberg 2002; Haverland et al 2011; Steunenberg & Rhinard 2010). There is (e.g.) clear 
evidence that some sectors (Enterprise, Agriculture, Health & Consumer) to a larger extent 
are complied with than others (notably Environmental policy) (Börzel & Knoll 2014). Thus 
some attempts at explaining such differences have been made (Börzel & Knoll 2014; 
Haverland et al 2011; Börzel et al 2011; Leutgert & Dannwolf 2009). These attempts describe 
systematic differences in compliance patterns between policy-sectors as well as introduce 
possible rule, preference and policy-based factors to explain this variance. Such factors that 
seem significant include e.g.: time available for transposition, type of legal act used for 
transposition, inter-ministerial coordination (Haverland et al 2011), commission vs. council 
directive (political conflict) (Haverland et al 2011; Börzel & Knoll 2014), market-correcting 
vs., market-making policy, regulatory density, EP involvement, directive complexity (Börzel 
& Knoll 2014). 
 
Börzel & Knoll (2014) groups sectors in accordance with aggregated directive features (e.g. 
regulatory density) to test if the distribution of these can explain compliance variance. This 
grouping, and the introduction of rule specific hypotheses in a larger data set on 
infringements, proves to have a good potential for explaining part of the differences between 
sectors (Börzel & Knoll 2014). In another study Haverland et al (2011) analyses hypotheses 
in a regression on transposition timelines and also have some luck at explaining part of the 
observed variance. However time and sector dummies in the regression reveals that the effect 
from the independent variables changes over time, and that sector remains significant as an 
explanatory variable (Haverland et al 2011). Thus the study concludes that sector differences 
are not fully captured by the directive features introduced by and that the time-dependency 
need more analysis (Haverland et al 2011).  
 
Therefore, while being elaborate and able to explain a large amount of variance between 
policy sectors regarding non-compliance, these studies are novel efforts to enter unchartered 
research territory (Börzel & Knoll 2014; Haverland et al 2011). Since the studies confirm and 
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disconfirm similar hypotheses it is plausible that these works reveals some of the reasons for 
variance between policy sectors. There is however methodological reasons to seriously doubt 
the validity of such conclusions inferred from quantitative work (see section 2.1.1). 
2.3 Strategies	  to	  gain	  better	  knowledge	  
The field of EU compliance research has experienced a steady increase since its rather late 
start in the late 1980s. As methodology and theory has developed over the years new fields of 
interest has been revealed and researched. While there is a god portion of knowledge on why 
countries systematically differ in regards to compliance, the differences between policy 
sectors have only started to be explained. The growing evidence on transposition and its 
underlying mechanisms has not yet been followed by research on its implications on, and the 
different logic of, practical compliance. Systematic critique towards measures used in the 
quantitative literature also casts doubts on some of the insights from such studies.  
 
Thus three directions for further research appear: (1) further analyses of sector variance in 
compliance, (2) studies on practical compliance, and (3) case studies to test indirect measures 
used in statistical research programs. This thesis focuses on the first and third of these 
possible directions for future research. The focus of the study – on political conflict – is 
justified by recent studies that analyses the impact of political actors´ preferences on 
compliance. This is exemplified by the qualification of the misfit hypothesis, and the studies 
by Haverland et al (2011) and Börzel & Knoll (2014). 
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3 Key	  concepts	  and	  theory	  	  
Given that the starting point for this thesis is recent attempts to link the level of political 
conflict over directives to differences in compliance between policy sectors, the theoretical 
foundation is necessarily also found within these scholarly efforts. Thus theories that justify 
preference-based explanatory variables are the theoretical basis for analysing compliance in 
this study (Haverland et al 2011; Börzel & Knoll 2014). This section starts by defining key 
concepts used in the thesis and continues with a specification of theoretical assumptions and 
premises that lays the foundation for operationalization of compliance and political conflict.  
3.1 Key	  concepts	  
3.1.1 Compliance	  and	  transposition	  
Compliance scholars often end up with contradicting claims about the amount, prevalence and 
reasons for (non-) compliance within the EU. This is partly due to different definitions of 
compliance (Hartlapp & Falkner 2009; Treib 2014). Thus any study on compliance must 
make its understanding of compliance clear and explicit. In this thesis Compliance is defined 
as MS adherence to commitments made at the EU level. Thus compliance refers to “actual 
change in behaviour in the direction of international [EU] injunctions” (Haas 1998:18). 
Regarding EU directives this means that complete compliance is only realised when 
transposition (legal/formal compliance) and application (practical compliance) are fulfilled. 
However the thesis will only deal with the first of these steps, transposition.  
 
Since application is not an object of study in this thesis its meaning will not be much further 
elaborated. In its final form application refers to “whether or not the final addressees of a rule 
[…] adhere to it” but the process of application also involves monitoring and enforcement of 
transposed (EU) rules (Hartlapp & Falkner 2009:284).  
 
Transposition is the foundation for application of EU directives and also the dependent 
variable in this thesis.  Transposition is the process in which directives becomes national 
legislation. Two aspects of this process are important for the efficient function of EU policy, 
timelines and correctness.  
 
Timeline refers to the requirement for a directive to be transposed (and applied) before a 
certain deadline specified in the legal act (Hartlapp & Falkner 2009). How much time that is 
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granted for transposition differs between directives. Whether or not this deadline is reached is 
the first and necessary requirement for transposition to be in accordance with the rules and 
practices of directive implementation. Missed deadlines (failure to notify) are furthermore the 
most common reason for the commission to open infringement procedures (Hartlapp & 
Falkner 2009).  
 
Correctness is the second and also necessary requirement of the transposition process. It 
refers to the obligation of MSs to transpose directives in accordance with its set aim and 
provisions (Hartlapp & Falkner 2009). Previous research have suggested that complete 
correctness however is hard to achieve and suggests that it is sufficient that transposition is 
essentially correct to be regarded as adequate (Falkner et al 2005). Even though such 
qualification of measures on correctness is advisable, it is evident that transposition can be 
achieved (however late) without following the timeline of a directive while transposition can 
never be viewed as achieved when correctness is not fulfilled. 
3.1.2 Political	  conflict	  	  
While transposition is the dependent variable in the thesis, political conflict serves as its main 
independent variable. The term conflict is described an array of theoretical meanings in 
scholarly literature. In this thesis political conflict should be understood in it simplest lexical 
meaning namely as “a [serious] disagreement or argument” between political actors (Oxford 
Dictionaries 2014). Political actors in this context refer mainly to (representatives of) political 
parties. In this thesis conflict is limited in scope to the MS level. Conflict between actors at 
the EU arena is thus not considered below.  
3.1.3 Council	  and	  Commission	  directives	  
The division between council and commission directives are central to this study. It is thus 
important to explain this division. The labelling as council and commission directives 
respectively emanates from which EU institution that has adopted the directive. While the 
council (or increasingly since the Lisbon treaty the council and EP together) adopts directives 
in the standard procedure for issuing a directive, the commission can adopt directives acting 
on delegation from the council (or council and EP). The commission thus adopts commission 
directives while the council adopts council directives.  
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3.2 Preference	  and	  capacity	  –	  Enforcement	  and	  management	  revised	  	  
As noted in the section on previous research, EU compliance studies have been informed by 
theories and approaches from different strands of scholarship including the influential IR 
debate between enforcement and management scholars (Börzel et al 2010; Treib 2014). I 
would argue that this debate has been central to theory development in EU compliance 
research, however not without qualification. Enforcement and management approaches in IR 
has developed as separate (and conflicting) perspectives, on how international agreements 
should be constructed to ensure compliance. Enforcement and management explanations in 
EU compliance research on the other hand, has been regarded increasingly as complementary 
(Tallberg 2002; Börzel et al 2010; Haverland et al 2011). Rather than focusing on the key 
assumptions18 of the approaches and its proposed strategies for achieving compliance19, EU 
compliance research starts in the division regarding the source of non-compliance, i.e. 
voluntary or involuntary non-compliance (Börzel et al 2010; Haverland et al 2011).  
 
Since most compliance scholars also are informed by theories that attribute more importance 
to political dynamics in the MSs than IR approaches (generally) does, the reference to 
management and enforcement theories becomes even more inconsequent (e.g. Börzel & Knoll 
2014; Haverland et al 2011; Mbaye 2001). Thus I propose that the theoretical division 
between preference- and capacity-based explanations is more instructive when discussing the 
research field. This division starts in the involuntary/voluntary dichotomy from IR theories 
while acknowledging that states are not necessary unitary actors. Thus some of the 
explanations from (developed) management perspectives are labelled preference, rather than 
capacity explanations as should be expected when reading the IR debate literally (Downs et al 
1996; Chaise & Chayes 1993). This since non-compliance originating in opposition from 
political actors in the MSs hardly can be viewed as involuntary even though the (government 
of the) MS originally intended to comply.  
3.2.1 Directives	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  political	  conflict	  
The main variable of interest (political conflict), and its frequently used operationalization 
(commission vs. council directives), is clear examples of why the preference-capacity divide 
is theoretically sound. The hypothesised reason for commission directives resulting in less 
                                                
18 E.g. that states are: unitary rational actors computing pros and cons for complying vs. actors in principal willing to comply 
with agreed treaties.  
19 Enforcement through sanctions vs. (administrative) capacity building, rule-interpretation and transparency. 
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non-compliance relies on three assumptions. (1) Issues (directives) that cause political conflict 
are less likely to be transposed correctly and on time due to political resistance. (2) That 
issues delegated to the commission are less politically salient for governments thus making 
the risk of political conflict in the EU less likely (Haverland et al 2011). (3) That these issues 
also are less salient for other political actors as well resulting in less political conflict in the 
MSs (Börzel & Knoll 2014). While it is clear that these are explanations relating to the 
preferences of different political actors, the relevant actors make one of these assumptions (2) 
a question of enforcement, while the other (3) fits better in the management approach 
tradition (Downs et al 1998).  
3.3 Main	  hypotheses	  
From this theoretical background three hypotheses are constructed, regarding the research 
questions. These are the starting point for the causal model below and the research design of 
the thesis. The first and second hypotheses follow closely from the reasoning in the 
paragraphs above, that commission directives cause less political conflict (H1) and that 
political conflict interferes with transposition (H2). The third hypothesis combines these two 
hypotheses in the sense that if these are true, the sector with a larger share of commission 
directives (Agriculture) should experience less transposition failures (H3)20.  
 
Q1: To what extent does the division between commission and council directives serve as a 
good proxy for the level of political conflict over directives? 
 
H1 Commission directives in the chosen sectors generally cause less political conflict 
than council directives. 
 
Q2: How is correct and timely transposition in Agriculture, Finance and Enterprise affected 
by political conflict over directives in Sweden? 
 
H2 Directives that cause more political conflict are less probable to be transposed 
correctly and on time. 
H3 A larger share of directives is transposed correctly and on time in the agricultural 
sector than in the finance and enterprise sectors.  
                                                
20 See section 4.2 for a discussion about the chosen sectors 
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3.3.1 Main	  theoretical	  model	  and	  competing	  explanations	  
Figure 1: The hypothesised relationship between political conflict and compliance 
 
The central starting point, for the causal model of the thesis, is the hypothesis that politically 
contested directives more often are transposed late and inadequately. From this background, 
figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the main independent (political conflict) and 
dependent (compliance) variables of the study. The figure furthermore underlines that there 
are alternative variables, which can affect the level of compliance, apart from political 
conflict. Some of these are controlled for in the thesis while there are additional variables that 
the study does not consider in its analyses.  
 
Six alternative variables are controlled for in the research design of the study, using two 
separate strategies. First the thesis keeps three variables constant in the case selection: market 
correcting policies, innovation of directives and EP involvement (section 4.2). Secondly 
competing hypotheses are tested in the second step of the empirical analysis. This latter 
strategy is used regarding time available for transposition, complexity and coordination 
(section 5.4.1). Competing explanations that is not controlled for within the scope of this 
thesis includes e.g. regulatory density, competence transfer, EU-level conflict, voting rule in 
the council, and administrative capacity (of Directorate Generals, government agencies etc.)21.  
  
                                                
21 See Haverland et al (2011) and Börzel & Knoll (2014) for in-depth discussions about these variables. See section 2.2 for 
additional variables.  
EU directive Level of political conflict  Level of compliance 
Alternative explanatory variables 
Transposition 
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4 Research	  design,	  Case	  selection	  and	  Method	  
The study in this thesis is a theory testing, medium-N22, comparative case study that uses a 
research design in two steps. In these steps a selection of EU-directive transposition processes 
are analysed to find evidence whether or not the theory above holds in the chosen context.  
 
The first step, which is an analysis of 56 strategically chosen transposition processes, is used 
to answer the first research question regarding the level of political conflict in commission 
and council directives respectively. This first step also measures the transposition timelines 
regarding the chosen directives and analyses this in relation to the level of political conflict, 
beginning to relate the main dependent and independent variables. Simultaneously the first 
step is constructed to be a further case-selection for the second step of the study.  
 
Step two is thus an in-depth analysis where 15 cases of transposition, where conflict is in the 
higher spectrum, are further analysed to connect the effect of political conflict to timelines as 
well as correctness of transposition. This part starts by eliminating cases (from the 15) where 
alterative reasons for transposition failures are likely and ends up with a thorough analysis of 
two cases where (potential) failures are likely to be because of political conflict.  
4.1 Method	  and	  operationalization	  
In the first step of the empirical analysis simple mathematical methods are used, to assess 
whether council directives are associated with political conflict to a higher degree than 
commission directives. Thus this step mainly follows a probabilistic logic. Accordingly the 
type of directive is believed to influence the probability that the political conflict have a 
certain value, while the level of conflict is hypothesised to affect the transposition result 
(timeline). Thus single cases of little political conflict over council directives and successful 
compliance in cases of intense political conflict does not necessarily disapprove (but 
weakens) the correctness of the hypotheses. The information about these factors (type of 
directive, political conflict, timelines) is gathered, using text analysis, from the Swedish 
transposition database (at the Swedish National Board of Trade), government propositions 
and parliamentary committee reports (SNBT 2015).  
 
                                                
22 Studies that analyses more cases than two and less than about 50 are often labelled medium- or intermediate-N studies (e.g. 
Lindeman 2011) 
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The second step of the empirical analysis makes use of the qualitative method process 
tracing. The main advantage of process tracing is its focus on close analysis of processes that 
makes use of all (as much as practically applicable of) available source materials to analyse 
whether a (set of) factor(s) causally influence the outcome of the process (Collier 2011). This 
thesis thus uses available source materials (e.g. official documents from the Swedish 
parliament and government, previous studies on single directives, commission monitoring 
reports etc.) to depict the implementation process of the 15 chosen directives. These pictures 
are increasingly detailed as directives are eliminated when testing three alternative 
hypotheses23. In the end, two directives remain for a thorough in-depth analysis. Finally four 
supporting hypotheses24 – that if confirmed increases the probability that political conflict and 
transposition failures are casually related – are tested in these two transposition processes.  
4.1.1 Operationalising	  directives	  and	  political	  conflict	  
While the operationalisation of the type of directive is self evident (it is stated in its name) 
finding an operative definition of political conflict requires more thought. Following the 
definition of political conflict in the theory section it is operationalised as different opinions 
of two or more actors over a certain policy (directive/transposition measure). While political 
conflict can exist without being visible in public source material this thesis deals only with 
conflict that can be seen in such sources. Thus political conflict referred to below is always 
limited in scope to visible political conflict rather than all actual conflict. Measuring of this is 
done using two indicators, (1) type of legislation and (2) parliamentary reservations. Both of 
these are found within the Swedish legislative procedure that is used to transpose directives.   
 
The EU MSs use different processes when transposing supranational policies. While some 
countries have specially crafted legislative procedures for transposition, others rely on their 
ordinary legislative processes (Steunenberg 2006:297). Sweden is of the latter kind (Sveriges 
Riksdag 2015). The responsibility for transposition of each directive rests within the relevant 
ministry where it is decided how and with what legal instrument transposition should be 
performed (Ministry of Justice 2007). The legislative process generally begins with an inquiry 
and then the government decides whether to transpose the legislation as a rule, government 
decree or an act of law.  
 
                                                
23 See hypotheses 8-10 in section 5.4.1 
24 See hypotheses 4-7 in section 5.4 
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Rules and government decrees are part of the Swedish legal body not adopted by the 
parliament but by government agencies or the government. Both of these legal acts are 
referred to as secondary law in the continuation of the thesis. If the directive is to be 
transposed as an act of law the government presents a legislative proposal (a bill) to the 
parliament. The bill is then discussed in the relevant parliamentary committee together with 
counter proposals from parliamentarians. The final report from the committee includes its 
(majority) proposal for decision in the parliament along with possible divergent opinions 
(reservations) from the committee minority (Ministry of Justice 2007).  
 
Thus the highest potential for political conflict is seen in directives transposed as acts of law 
rather than secondary law. In the empirical analysis transposition in form of secondary law 
will accordingly be regarded as transposition with low levels of political conflict. The level of 
conflict regarding acts of law are correspondingly (1) higher than that of secondary law and 
(2) further measured by the reservations in the committee report(s). The content of such 
reservations are furthermore qualitatively assessed to analyse whether or not these are likely 
to have caused a specific transposition failure.  
4.1.2 Timelines	  
While the timing of transposition in quantitative studies is generally measured through 
notification data from the commission, this thesis operationalizes timelines through a manual 
analysis of transposition. This analysis includes (1) to extract the transposition deadline from 
the legal text of the directive and (2) compare this to the date when the transposition 
measure(s) enter into force. The operationalization does however not include correctness of 
transposition.  
4.1.3 Correctness	  
While some scholars argue that assessing correctness by comparing directives and transposing 
acts is a rather straightforward process, the analysis in this thesis has proven that legal 
expertise should be used to produce viable results in this field, and that this requires time-
consuming analyses (Falkner et al 2005). Thus the correctness of directives is only discussed 
regarding the two final directives of the analysis. This is done by making use of previously 
published analyses as well as by comparing transposition measures with the provisions in the 
directives. It should be noted that this analysis is to be regarded as provisional and require 
further work to be fully reliable.  
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4.2 Data	  and	  case	  selection	  
Since the independent variable of the thesis originates in the studies by Haverland et al (2011) 
and Börzell & Knoll (2014), control variables that are to be kept constant in the selection of 
relevant cases are chosen from these studies as well. Thus theoretically sound and empirically 
tested variables that can distort the effect of the main independent variable are less likely to 
do so. However there are a multitude of (unknown) factors that can still influence the result.  
 
To control some of these factors the full sample of cases are studied in one country only 
(Sweden) why the results cannot be fully representative to the wider population (all EU 
countries). However since the study is not interested in cross-country differences – but rather 
to test if the chosen operationalisation of the independent variable is sound and if the relative 
higher number of commission directives in the agricultural sector (and thus less political 
conflict) can explain part of the cross sector variance in compliance records – there are good 
reasons to stick to only one country.  
 
First of all analysing only one country keeps a long list of institutional, historical and political 
factors constant across the sample. Second, the convenience of only analysing Sweden allows 
the study to use a larger sample of cases and thus strengthens inferences regarding the tested 
theory within the Swedish context. Third Sweden arguably constitutes a least likely context 
regarding the likelihood that political conflict affect compliance25 (Falkner et al 2005; 
Sverdrup 2004). Thus if the empirical material provides evidence in favour of the proposed 
hypotheses the conclusions of the study regarding the merit of the theory can be more 
confident. 
 
Cases are selected using data from the Swedish National Board of Trade on transposition of 
directives (SNBT 2015). The transposition data covers all directives that have been 
transposed up until 2009. Since transposition deadlines often are set at two years after a 
directive has come into force (but longer/shorter deadlines exist) the use of the database is 
restricted to directives that came into force before 2007. This study will use a sample of cases 
in the period 2000-2006. Starting in 2000 assures that all directives have had the possibility to 
                                                
25 Which follows the logic from Falkner et al (2005), who places the Nordic countries in the world of law observance where 
”the compliance goal typically overrides domestic concerns because it ranks too high” (Falkner et al 2005:321). Other 
scholars, such as Sverdrup (2004) further corroborate this statement. 
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be affected by Sweden since its entry into the EU in 1995 (and non-compliance is therefore 
less likely to be because of a sense of lacking influence). The time period covers a total of 705 
directives in all policy sectors while the sample consists of 56 directives in three sectors.  
 
The sample selection procedure for the dataset proceeded in three steps. (1) All amending 
directives where taken out of the sample, (2) all directives where the EP is a cosignatory 
where deleted and (3) the policy sectors Finance, Enterprise and Agriculture where chosen as 
the constituent policies of the sample. Amending directives are not included since the 
innovation (amending or new) of a directive are suggested to have an influence on compliance 
by a long line of scholars including Haverland (et al 2011) and Börzel & Knoll (2014) (see 
also Haverland & Romeijn 2007; Kaeding 2006; Steunenberg & Rhinard 2010). EP 
involvement are a further factor that seems to influence compliance, thus this is kept constant 
by excluding all directives where the EP has a say. Furthermore by only including Council 
and Commission directives the directives with most and least political salience respectively 
should be analysed26 (Börzel & Knoll 2014).  
 
The selection of policy sectors requires further qualification. The data on transposition in 
Sweden contains two pieces of information regarding policy sectors: which national 
department that is responsible and a very fine-grained policy classification. The sample is 
chosen on basis of responsible department for two reasons. First it is (relatively) easily 
accessible since it consists of 13 categories instead of the policy classification where hundreds 
of specific policy areas divide the data. Second, when analysing only three departments issues 
such as (inter alia) administrative traditions and capacity are kept rather constant. The 
selected sectors have been chosen with two further criteria in mind. (1) There are both council 
and commission directives present and (2) there is as much variation as possible in the share 
of council directives in the sample. The mix of council and commission directives in the 
relevant sectors27 is shown in table 2. This data includes EP involvement and amending 
directives.  
  
                                                
26 Council directives should be most politically salient since the council alone handles EU matters where concerns about 
national sovereignty are most present. The power of the commission to adopt directives on the other hand relies on delegation 
from the council (and EP), which should only be granted in cases when the EU-level conflict is low (Börzel & noll 2014).  
27 Sectors where there are commission or council directives between 2000-2006 and at least more than one in the sample after 
amending and EP directives are excluded.  
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Table 2: Expected political conflict in policy sectors, 2000-2006,  
 Council/EP Commission Council/EP (share) Political conflict  
Agriculture 67 166 29 % - 
Enterprise 106 53 62 % + 
Environment 66 102 39 % - 
Finance 66 11 86 % + 
Foreign affairs  12 0 100 % + 
Justice 34 0 100 % + 
Social 14 36 28 % - 
 
Since Foreign affairs and Justice not include any commission directives these two sectors 
cannot be used for this analysis since some variance in this variable is needed as to investigate 
the difference in political conflict between directives. Environment and Social policy are 
excluded from the study since much of previous research is focused on those sectors. 
Furthermore, these sectors are predominantly market-correcting sectors, another factor with 
possible effect on compliance (Börzel & Knoll 2014). Thus the final sample consist of two 
sectors where the level political conflict is expected to be high (Finance and Enterprise) and 
one where it is expected to be low (Agriculture), all of which predominantly are market-
making28.  
 
The sample contains 72 directives of which 31 are council directives and 41 are directives 
originating from the European Commission. In the first step of the empirical analysis, where 
the cases where investigated more thoroughly a further 16 directives where excluded from the 
material. This concerns 14 directives that where codification of a long series of amendments 
regarding the issue at hand. Thus these particular directives where not subject to any 
transposition measures and consequently no data on political conflict or transposition 
timelines could be found. This is also true for the two remaining excluded directives, which 
were deemed by the Swedish authorities not to need any transposition measures. Therefore 
the analysis is founded on data regarding 56 directives adopted between 2000 and 2006.  
                                                
28 Market-making policies are believed to be more easy to comply with since they: ”do not require member states to take 
action or develop and police the application of new legislation” (Börzel & Knoll 2014:9) 
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5 Empirical	  analysis	  
5.1 Political	  conflict	  –	  an	  overview	  
The most common measure for transposing the directives in the sample of this thesis is by 
using only secondary law, which is done in 41 of the 56 cases of transposition (73 %) (see 
appendix 1 for a full list of directives and transposition measures). Thus most directives in the 
sample were transposed with very limited potential for political conflict to occur and to 
influence the transposition process.  
Table 3: Share of directives transposed as acts of law and secondary law respectively 
Sector Acts of 
law 
Secondary 
law 
Acts of law  
(Commission) 
Acts of law 
(Council) 
Reservations*** 
Council Comm. 
Agriculture 0 % 100 % 0 % 0 %* 0 0 
Finance 100 % 0 % 100 %** 100 % 7 4 
Enterprise 56 % 44 % 0 % 100 % 49 0 
Total 27 % 73 % 18 % 39 % 56 4 
* See below in this section for qualification regarding six epizooty directives 
** See section 5.2.2 below for qualification regarding directive 2006/73/EC 
*** Summary of committee reservations in table 4 
 
As can be seen in table 3, the share of directives implemented by secondary law differs 
significantly between sectors as well as between council and commission directives. All 
directives in the agricultural sector have been transposed as secondary law. The finance sector 
is found on the other side of the spectrum where all of the directives where transposed as acts 
of law. The enterprise sector is the middle case where 56 % of the directives where transposed 
as acts of law while the remaining 44 % where transposed as secondary law.  
 
The difference between commission and council directives regarding the choice of 
transposition measure in the sample is fully caused by the enterprise sector. In this sector all 
council directives were transposed as acts of law while all of the four commission directives 
where transposed as secondary law. The higher levels of political conflict regarding council 
directives are also underlined when looking at committee reservations from the deliberations 
in parliament. While council directives on average cause about five or six reservations each in 
the parliamentary process, there are an average of less than one reservation per commission 
directive. Furthermore, only two of nine transpositions of council directives where passed 
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through parliament without any visible opposition. All but one of the transposition measures 
concerning commission directives where decided without any parliamentary opposition.  
 
Two qualifications regarding the numbers above need to be highlighted. First there are six 
agricultural directives passed by the council that are not clear-cut cases of secondary law 
transposition, however regarded as such above. Second, all of the commission directives in 
the finance sector where transposed in the same process as one or more council/EP-Council 
directives. The latter will be further discussed in section 5.2 below. The former however 
needs immediate attention.  
 
Six council directives29 on agricultural issues passed between 2000 and 2006 concerns 
measures to control certain animal deceases. According to the Swedish dataset on 
transposition measures, these directives where transposed by the law on epizootic diseases30 
and corresponding secondary law. However, since the law was passed about a year prior to 
the adoption of the first of these directives, the political process transposing these directives 
cannot be seen as involving the creation of this law (Prop. 1998/99:88). Thus the only 
relevant transposition measures in these cases, for the analysis in this thesis, are the rules 
(secondary law) following the adoption of the six consecutive directives. However it should 
be noted that these transposition processes are tightly related to the recent law-making 
procedure. Therefore the transposition might not be as politically non-contested as it seems. 
The lack of political conflict might be explained by that conflicted issues were resolved prior, 
but related, to the transposition of the six epizooty directives. 
5.2 Directives	  transposed	  as	  acts	  of	  law	  
There are 15 directives in the sample that are transposed using acts of law. Additional 
secondary law also transposes most of these directives. However since it is within the process 
of making acts of law that political conflict can be expected to vary in a high conflict 
spectrum, the secondary laws are not considered in the following analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                
29 Council directives: 2000/75/EC; 2001/89/EC; 2002/60/EC; 2003/85/EC; 2005/94/EC; 2006/88/EC (see appendix 2 for 
further information) 
30 Epizootilag (SFS 1999:657) 
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Table 4: Directives transposed as acts of law 
For further information on these directives, see appendix 1 
 
Five of the directives in table 4 are found in the enterprise sector while the remaining ten 
directives derive from the financial sector. The council adopted nine of these directives (five 
enterprise and four financial directives) while six are commission directives (six financial 
directives). Three of the commission directives31 are transposed in one single legislative 
process where they are additionally bundled together with a council and EP directive32. Thus 
there are nine cases of transposition of council directives while only four cases regarding 
commission directives. All of these cases are more closely discussed in the following section.  
 
                                                
31 Commission directives: 2003/124/EC; 2003/125/EC; 2004/72/EC (see appendix 1 for further information) 
32 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse) 
Directive S Transposition measure Conflict in committee 
Council directive 2001/86/EC  E SFS 1987:1245; SFS 
1996:359; SFS 2004:559  
No visible conflict 
Council directive 2003/72/EC  E SFS 2006:477 - 2006:479 No visible conflict 
Council directive 2004/67/EC  E SFS 2006:646 3 reservations  
Council directive 2004/113/EC  E SFS 1915:218; SFS 1991:433; 
SFS 1995:584; SFS 2003:307 
1 stage - 29 reservations 
2 stage - 15 reservations 
Council directive 2005/47/EC E SFS 2008:475; SFS 2008:476  2 reservations 
Council directive 2003/48/EC F SFS 2003:1130; SFS 
2005:344; SFS 2005:345 
1 stage - no opposition,  
2 stage – 1 reservation 
Council directive 2003/49/EC  F SFS 2004:614 1 reservation 
Council directive 2003/96/EC  
 
F SFS 2006:1508; SFS 
2006:1512 
1, 2, and 3 stage - no opposition 
4 stage - 2 reservations 
Council directive 2006/112/EC  
 
F SFS 1994:200; SFS 
2006:1031; SFS 2007:1376  
3 reservations  
Commission directive 2002/94/EC F Lag SFS 2003:142 No opposition 
Commission directive 2003/124/EC 
Commission directive 2003/125/EC  
Commission directive 2004/72/EC 
F SFS 2005:377 - 2005:382;  
SFS 2005:485 
No opposition 
Commission directive 2006/70/EC F SFS 2009:62, SFS 2009:63 - 
2009:78 
4 reservations  
Commission directive 2006/73/EC  F SFS 2007:528 No opposition 
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All directives that are transposed as acts of law are however not associated with an equal level 
of political conflict. Nor does the process of transposition regarding all these directives share 
the same general characteristics. While the transposition regarding all of the 15 directives 
involve a parliamentary legislative procedure, each directive plays very different roles in the 
deliberations regarding the transpositions. There are three types of transposition processes 
regarding the directives in the sample. Processes that: (1) are dedicated to transpose one 
directive only, (2) bundles a number of directives on the same issue together, (3) puts 
transposition measures in the context of a related (non EU) legislative proposal. These types 
of processes are referred to as (1) single-, (2) bundle- and (3) context- processes in the 
remainder of the thesis.  
5.2.1 Single	  directive	  transposition	  
There are five33 directives in the sample that have been transposed using a bill dedicated to 
transpose this directive solely. These are all council directives and three of them concern 
enterprise policy while the remaining two are dedicated to financial issues.  
5.2.1.1 Council	  directive	  2001/86/EC	  	  
The Council directive 2001/86/EC on the involvement of employees in European Companies 
(ECs) where adopted by the council on the 8th of October in 2001 with its transposition 
deadline set to three years later, the 8th of October 2004. The Swedish transposition process 
began with the government’s directions to the inquiry committee on the 6th of June in 2002 
and finished when the legal act entered into force in October 2004. The main transposition 
measure were the creation of a new law (SFS 2004:559) that was constructed with the sole 
purpose to transpose the directive.  
 
While the government bill, that preceded the making of the law, covered only the 
transposition of the directive itself the committee report where a bit different (Prop. 
2003/04:122). Along the government proposal the committee report also included the 
committee´s and its minority’s statements on a series of proposals from the members of 
parliament (MEPs). Even though there is a wide range of political conflict (25 reservations 
from 40 parties) within the committee report there is no visible conflict regarding the directive 
(Bet. 2003/04:AU4).  
                                                
33 Council directives: 2001/86/EC; 2003/49/EC; 2003/72/EC; 2003/96/EC; 2005/47/EC 
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5.2.1.2 Council	  directive	  2003/72/EC	  
The Council directive 2003/72/EC on involvement of employees in European Cooperative 
Societies (ECSs) was adopted on the 22 of July 2003. The Transposition process was quite 
like the one transposing directive 2001/86/EC and was primarily performed by issuing a new 
law on employee involvement in ECSs, (SFS 2006:477). The law entered into force on the 
transposition deadline of the directive and the government bill was handled with no visible 
opposition in the parliamentary process (Bet. 2005/06:AU9).  
5.2.1.3 Council	  directive	  2005/47/EC	  
The transposition of directive 2005/47/EC is one of two processes that have been more 
thoroughly analysed and will thus be presented below (see section 5.5) 
5.2.1.4 Council	  directive	  2003/49/EC	  
The Council directive 2003/49/EC on taxation regarding interest and royalty payments was 
adopted on the third of June 2003, and was supposed to be transposed by the MSs no later 
than the 1st of January 2004. The directive was transposed in Sweden by the introduction of 
changes to the law on income taxation (SFS 1999:1229) that was applicable from January 
2004. The report recommended the parliament to decide in line with the government proposal 
with some minor formality adjustments due to the 2004 EU enlargement. The committee 
report also contained one reservation that backed a proposal to go further in limiting taxation 
for royalty payments. (Bet. 2003/04:SkU32).  
 
This transposition process is regarded as a single directive transposition even though the bill 
also included some minor changes due to amendments in previous taxation directives (Prop. 
2003/04:126). While this could maker the process a bundle transposition the fact, that these 
complementary changes are so small relative to the changes mentioned above, is decisive 
when labelling the process.   
5.2.1.5 	  Council	  directive	  2003/96/EC	  
The Council directive 2003/96/EC on energy and electricity taxation was adopted on the 27 of 
October 2003. The deadline for transposition of the directive was set to 31st of December 
2003 (with some exceptions). The Legislative procedure finalising the transposition of the 
directive was decided by the parliament on the 14th of December 2006 following a bill from 
the government. The proposal highlights that there has been previous measures adapting the 
Swedish energy taxes to the requirements of the directive in three steps. These steps include: 
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(1) adjustment of taxes on electricity in industrial processes in 2004, (2) tax relief to industrial 
companies taking part in a program for energy efficiency in 2005, and finally in 2006 (3) 
additional adjustments in the taxation of energy (Prop. 2006/07:13). These changes were 
made either as part of the budgetary process (1 and 3) or by the creation of a new law (2) 
(SFS 2004:1196). These first three transposition phases were passed through the parliament 
without any opposition34 (Bet. 2003/04:FiU1; Bet. 2005/06:FiU1). The fourth and final part of 
the transposition made changes that entered into force the 1st of January 2007 and 2008 
respectively (Bet. 2006/07:SkU5). The committee report on the bill handled two proposals 
from MEPs alongside the government proposal. The committee, due to the MEP proposals 
and awaiting a Commission decision on state aid, suggested some minor changes to the bill. 
The committee report furthermore contains two reservations backing the full wording of the 
MEP proposals (Bet. 2006/07:SkU5).  
 
The final transposition measures came about four years after the deadline. It is thus not a 
surprise that the proposal was preceded by an infringement procedure in 2004, which claimed 
Sweden had not yet transposed the entirety of the directive. Even though the government 
replied that a wide range of transposing measures had been instigated Sweden confessed that 
the transposition was not to be finalised prior to 2007 (Skr. 2004/05:60).  
5.2.2 Bundled	  transposition	  processes	  
The most common procedure for transposing the directives in the sample is by bundling 
directives on the same issue together to one bill covering the whole issue area. This is done in 
five transposition processes covering seven of the directives35. All but one (five) of the 
commission directives transposed as acts of law are part of a bundle process while the sixth36 
directive is transposed in the context of a wider legislative proposal (see 5.2.3). 
5.2.2.1 Commission	  directives	  2003/124/EC,	  2003/125/EC	  and	  2004/72/EC	  
The transposition of commission directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC is 
part of the wider process to transpose the council and EP Directive 2003/6/EC on insider 
dealing and market manipulation (market abuse). The centrepiece of this process was the 
                                                
34 These were part of budgetary negotiations where the measures transposing the directive were not an issue of conflict.  
35 Council directives: 2003/48/EC; 2004/113/EC; Commission directives: 2003/124/EC; 2003/125/EC; 2004/72/EC; 
2006/70/EC; 2006/73/EC 
36 Commission directive 2002/94/EC 
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creation of a new law (SFS 2005:377) and also included adjustments in six related pieces of 
legislation (Bet. 2004/05:FiU27). The process, while being extensive and finished eight 
months after the transposition deadline, was passed through parliament with no sign of 
conflict (Bet 2004/05:FiU27).  
5.2.2.2 Commission	  directive	  2006/70/EC	  
The commission directive 2006/70/EC lays down implementing measures such as definitions, 
technical criteria and exemptions regarding the Council and EP directive 2005/60/EC, also 
known as the Third Money Laundering Directive. Thus the transposition process for the 
commission directive is a part of the transposition of this parent directive. The proposed 
transposition measures entered into force about 16 months after the transposition deadline. 
The transposition included the creation of a new law (SFS 2009:62) and adjustments to 17 
related pieces of legislation. The responsible committee in the parliament proposed that the 
government bill should be adopted with some minor technical changes, and four reservations 
to the committee proposal were issued. These reservations regarded adjustments of the bill, 
however not in substantial conflict with the content of the proposal.  
5.2.2.3 Commission	  directive	  2006/73/EC	  
The commission directive 2006/73/EC is an implementing directive that defines part of the 
Council and EP directive 2004/39/EC on financial instruments. As noted above this fits the 
transposition of the directive into the same process as its parent directive. These directives 
where transposed by legislative measures entering into force on the 1st of November 2007 and 
thus on time regarding the transposition deadline for the parent directive as well as the 
commission legal act (bet. 2006/07:FiU25). The transposition went through the parliament 
without any reservations.  
 
One additional feature of this transposition process should be highlighted regarding the 
potential for political conflict. The transposition measures connected to the constituent articles 
of the directives are described in a cross-reference table issued by the National Board of 
Trade (SNBT [no date a]). From this it is evident that while the parent directive is mainly 
transposed using an act of law (SFS 2007:528)37, the commission directive is almost in its 
entirety transposed as rules from the government agency Finansinspektionen. Thus, while the 
transposition process is in the spectrum of high potential for political conflict, the actual 
                                                
37 And changes to 43 related legal acts 
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transposition of the commission directive could be viewed as transposition through secondary 
law. In any case it must be concluded that the transposition (of 2006/73/EC) at least is one of 
low conflict in comparison to other directives transposed in a process including the making of 
acts of law.  
5.2.2.4 Council	  directive	  2003/48/EC	  
The transposition of council directive 2003/48/EC, on taxation of savings income from 
interest payments, borders between being a single directive process and a bundle process. The 
directive was transposed in two stages. In the first stage, in 2003, the directive was the main 
act in a government bill, which suggested amendments to three tax laws in Sweden38. A EU 
regulation rather than the directive caused some of these amendments. (Prop. 2003/04:24). 
This bill was passed by the parliament without any visible opposition (Bet. 2003/04:SkU14). 
 
The second stage of the transposition was a bill that proposed some changes to a law (SFS 
2001:1227) and to accept ten agreements on taxes with inter alia Anguilla, Aruba and the 
Cayman islands (Prop. 2004/05:113). Both of these measures were taken to implement the 
directive 2003/48/EC and were passed by the parliament on the 18th of May in 2005. The 
decision was made in accordance with the committee report that caused one reservation.  
 
Since the first measures to transpose was taken well before the transposition deadline (1st of 
January 2004), and the second entered into force in accordance with the application deadline 
(1st of July 2005), of the directive the transposition must be said to have reached the standard 
set by the directive (Bet. 2004/05:SkU30).  
5.2.2.5 Council	  directive	  2004/113/EC	  
When the council directive 2004/113/EC – on equal treatment of men and women regarding 
access to and supply of goods and services – was adopted the Swedish government claimed 
that no immediate transposition measures were necessary (Prop. 2004/05:147). This 
judgement was primarily based on the fact that a new law on discrimination had just been 
passed by the parliament (Skr. 2005/06:85). However, while this should exclude the directive 
from this sample the government also stated that there were a need for further inquiry on the 
matter and thus possibly complementing transposition measures (Skr. 2005/06:85). Such 
measures where indeed adopted by the parliament in 2009 and 2012. In 2009 the Swedish law 
                                                
38 (SFS 2001:1227), (SFS 1994:200), (SFS 1990:314)  
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on discrimination where replaced by a new version (SFS 2008:567) and in 2012 the law was 
updated regarding insurance issues (Bet. 2007/08:AU7; Bet. 2011/12:AU11).   
 
The 2009 transposition measures were adopted following the committee report that further 
contained 29 reservations regarding the bill (Bet. 2007/08:AU7). The 2012 measures were 
adopted by the parliament following the committee proposal alongside 15 reservations from 
the committee minority (Bet. 2011/12:AU11).  
5.2.3 Context	  transposition	  processes	  	  
Three of the analysed directives39 are transposed in context processes. These are instances 
where the directives are transposed as a small part of a larger legislative proposal covering 
non-EU policy measures.  
5.2.3.1 Council	  directive	  2004/67/EC	  
The transposition of directive 2004/67/EC is one of two processes that have been more 
thoroughly analysed and will thus be presented below (see section 5.5) 
5.2.3.2 Council	  directive	  2006/112/EC	  
The council directive 2006/112/EC on value added tax (VAT) is transposed into Swedish law 
as an adjustment to the law on VAT (SFS 1994:200). The bill for the transposition where a 
part of a government proposal concerning several issues of reform to the system for VAT. 
The background for the proposal were, apart from the need to adjust to EU law, several 
government reports on different aspects of the Swedish VAT legislation (Prop. 2007/08:25). 
The tax committee in the parliament handled the bill and recommended the chamber to adopt 
the proposed legislative measures. Three reservations backing counter proposals from MEPs 
were attached to the committee report (Bet. 2007/08:SkU14). The transposition measures 
entered into force on the 1st of January 2008 and thus on time to reach the transposition 
deadline set by the directive.  
5.2.3.3 Commission	  directive	  2002/94/EC	  
The Commission directive 2002/94/EC lays down detailed implementing rules on assistance 
between MSs regarding recovery of claims relating to taxes etc. The directive was adopted in 
December 2002 with a transposition deadline set to 30th of April 2003. The short amount of 
time is used as an explanation as to why the directive where transposed by including its 
                                                
39 Council directives 2004/67/EC; 2006/112/EC, Commission directive 2002/94/EC 
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entirety as an annex to the Swedish law. The bill proposing this method of transposition was 
included as a last section of a much more extensive legislative proposal on administrative fees 
in the field of taxes and customs (Prop. 2002/03:106). The transposition was however handled 
by the parliamentary committee separately as to speed up the process to reach the 
transposition deadline. The bill was passed without any visible political opposition (Bet. 
2002/03:SkU15).  
5.3 Meeting	  the	  deadline	  –	  transposition	  timelines	  
This step of the empirical material analyses whether or not the directives where transposed on 
time. This data is available in the original data set described above (SNBT 2015). However 
when analysing the cases that is transposed as acts of law qualitatively it is evident that the 
information in the data set is not always accurate. Thus the transposition timeline for each of 
the 56 directives have been manually assessed. In eight of the cases information, apart from 
the data set, has not been accessible and in these cases the original data are used. 
 
Table 5: Share of directives transposed on time (by transposing measure) 
 Total Agriculture Enterprise Finance 
Acts of law 47 % N/A 60 % 40 % 
Secondary law 78 % 76 % 100 % N/A 
 
Table 5 reveals that a higher share of those directives that were transposed using only 
secondary legislation was also transposed on time. Furthermore, in the sector where there are 
no commission directives (Finance) the transposition processes are much more often overdue 
than in the sectors where such legislation exists. From the numbers regarding the enterprise 
sector, the pattern that secondary law more often meet its deadlines are corroborated in that 
sense that acts of law are more often associated with delay within the sector.  
 
Table 6: Share of directives transposed on time (by visible opposition) 
 On time 
Reservation(s) 44 %  
No reservation 50 % 
 
The relationship between political conflict and transposition delay persist, however weakened, 
when comparing transposition processes where there are reservations in the committee reports 
and those where no visible opposition is present (see table 6). While 44 % of the processes 
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with visible opposition where transposed on time, 50 % of the remaining processes where 
finished without delay. When compensating for the fact that the three commission directives40 
that where transposed in one process where delayed, the difference increases dramatically. If 
this process is regarded as one instance of directive transposition – rather than three – the 
share of transpositions, where opposition is visible, that where finished on time decreases to 
29 %41. 
 
However the relative high share of delayed transposition in the agricultural sector to some 
extent counter these inferences (see table 5). While there are clearly more directives 
transposed on time in the agricultural sector than in finance there are also more cases of delay 
in agriculture than in enterprise policy. Thus the share of directives being transposed as acts 
of law cannot fully explain the variance in transposition delay between the policy sectors in 
the sample.  
5.3.1 Delay	  –	  a	  function	  of	  adopting	  institution?	  
Since the data above reveals that there seems to be a relationship between political conflict 
and transposition timelines, as well as between council/commission directives and political 
conflict, it seems reasonable to expect that there is a relationship between the adopting 
institution and transposition delays. Some evidence pointing in that expected direction as well 
as some counterintuitive findings are presented in table 7.  
 
Table 7: Share of directives transposed on time (by adopting institution) 
 Total Agr. Enter. Fin. 
Commission 70 % 74 % 100 % 33 % 
Council 70 % 79 % 60 % 50 % 
Total 70 % 76 %  78 % 40 % 
 
Counting all the council and commission directives respectively there is no difference in 
transposition timelines at all between these two categories. An even more disapproving fact 
for the expectation that council directives more often cause non-compliance is that council 
                                                
40 Directives: 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC 
41 If this is applied to the numbers in table 5, the share of transposition processes with acts of law present that met its deadline 
increases to 54 %, only marginally weakening the inferences above.  
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directives are more often transposed on time in agriculture as well as finance. There are 
however some qualification to these concussions.  
 
First of all, the transposition failures in agriculture are not likely to be because of political 
conflict. This, since all these directives are transposed using secondary law. Secondly, the 
very low number of commission directives transposed on time in finance is at least to some 
extent caused by the fact that three directives are transposed together in a delayed 
transposition process. If these were to be counted as one, instead of three, instances of delay 
the share of commission directives transposed on time in finance would be equal to the 
amount of council directives transposed on time (50 %). That transposition of all but one42 of 
the commission directives in finance is part of a process transposing council directives as 
well, further qualifies the inferences countering the expected result.  
5.4 Back	  to	  the	  hypotheses	  
The sections above reveal that there is a systematic difference between commission and 
council directives as to the political conflict that these directives cause. Commission 
directives do seem to cause less political conflict than council directives thus reaffirming the 
first hypothesis (H1) of the thesis. While hypothesis two and three are further examined in the 
following sections, some evidence in support for the assumption that political conflict is 
associated with transposition failures (H2) are found in the analysis above. The third 
hypothesis (H3) however is to some extent disapproved. This since the enterprise sector, 
rather than the agricultural, seems to be subject of least transposition failures in the sample. 
See section 6 for a more in-depth discussion on the results.  
5.5 In	  hunt	  for	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  –	  how	  do	  conflict	  influence	  compliance?	  
In this section the 15 processes of transposition through acts of law will be analysed more 
thoroughly to establish if political conflict in these processes did cause late (and wrong) 
transposition of the directives. This is done as a process-tracing analysis where four 
supporting hypotheses (diagnostic clues) are formulated and tested. These hypotheses need to 
be true if a causal link is to be established between political conflict and late/wrong 
transposition. The hypotheses are:  
 
 
                                                
42 Dir. 2002/94/EC 
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H4: The level of political conflict over the directive is high 
H5: The political conflict is visible in the transposition process 
H6: The political conflict precedes (the end of) the transposition process 
H7: The transposition of the directive is late/wrong 
 
Thus the tracing starts by eliminating all directives that are not transposed as acts of law since 
these represent processes with limited potential for political conflict. The three remaining 
hypotheses must however be tested in a more in-depth analysis (see 5.5). 
5.5.1 Eliminating	  competing	  hypotheses	  
A central part of process tracing is to test and eliminate alternative reasons for the 
phenomenon in the focal point of the study (Collier 2011). Thus three alternative hypotheses 
based on previous studies have been formulated. A content analysis of the 15 directives and 
documents from the transposition process tests these hypotheses to eliminate directives that 
are likely to be affected by competing explanatory variables.  
 
Markus Haverland (et al 2011) argues (and demonstrates) that the more time the MSs are 
granted to transpose, the better they are at transposing on time. Thus tight deadlines should be 
a factor that makes compliance worse.  
 
H8: Late/wrong transposition of directives with tight deadlines is likely to be caused by the 
short amount of time granted for its transposition.  
 
Börzel & Knoll (2014) argues that complex directives are less likely to be complied with than 
simple ones. As a measurement of complexity they, and other scholars, use the number of 
recitals in each of the directives since these: “list the areas of application of a directive and 
define how many regulatory areas are affected” (Börzel & Knoll 2014:24; Steunenberg & 
Rhinard 2010; Kaeding 2006). 
 
H9: Late/wrong transposition of directives with many recitals is likely to be caused by its 
complexity. 
 
The third alternative factor that is considered in this analysis is inter-sectorial coordination, 
which is suggested to influence compliance negatively (Haverland et al 2011). The rationale 
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for this is that transposition processes that require different branches of government (or 
parliament) to coordinate are more time consuming and complex. 
 
H10: Late/wrong transposition of directives that require inter-sectorial coordination is likely 
to be caused by coordination failure. 
 
The fundamental prerequisites for these hypotheses to be true are the existence of:  
 
H8: Short transposition deadlines 
H9: Complex directives 
H10: Inter-sectorial coordination 
 
Table 8: Eliminating competing hypotheses 
Directive On time H8 H9 H10 Political conflict 
Council 2003/96/EC N (36M) 2     
Commission 2002/94/EC Y 5     
Council 2003/48/EC Y 6     
Council 2003/49/EC N (4M) 6     
Commission 2004/72/EC N (8M) 7     
Commission 2003/124/EC N (8M) 10     
Commission 2003/125/EC N (8M) 10     
Commission 2006/73/EC Y 12 85    
Council 2006/112/EC Y 13 67    
Commission 2006/70/EC N (16M) 16 17 Yes  
Council 2001/86/EC Y 36 20 No No visible conflict 
Commission 2003/72/EC Y 37 23 No No visible conflict 
Council 2004/113/EC Y 36 29 No 1 stage - 29 reservations (33 parties),  
2 stage - 15 reservations (8 parties) 
Council 2004/67/EC N (2M) 25 19 No 3 reservations  
Council 2005/47/EC N (5M) 37 20 No 2 reservations 
H8: Time for transposition, H9: Number of recitals (complexity), H10: Inter-ministerial coordination 
The testing of hypotheses 8-10 in the empirical material is constructed as a hoops test, which 
means that the existence of the factors are necessary for the underlying theories to be valid 
however not sufficient to confirm them (Collier 2011). Hence in the cases where these factors 
are not found they cannot be a part of the reason for non-compliance. However, the mere 
existence of the factors is not enough to confirm the competing hypotheses either.  
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Table 8 visualises the process of testing hypothesis 8-10 in all of the 15 directives. The first 
seven directives in the table were left less than a year for transposition, the following two 
represent extreme values regarding the amount of recitals while the transposition of the tenth 
directive in the table was subjected to political processes involving two policy sectors (Justice 
and Finance). Thus these directives are more likely than the remaining five to have been 
influenced by one of these alternative factors.  
 
Regarding the remaining transposition processes a long line of possible factors for non-
compliance has been eliminated. This makes them good candidates for processes where 
political conflict could have caused any delay or inadequate transposition. Two of these 
directives 43  are not included in the forthcoming analysis since there were no visible 
opposition in the transposition processes. Directive 2004/113/EC will not be part of the 
analysis since the transposition involves multiple steps. Thus the following analysis includes 
the council directives 2004/67/EC and 2005/47/EC. The analysis answers the four supporting 
hypotheses (H4-7 above) and thus increases/decreases the probability that political conflict is 
what has caused late and wrong transposition.  
5.6 The	  directives	  
5.6.1 The	  gas	  supply	  directive	  (GSD)	  
The Council directive 2004/67/EC on the security of natural gas supply (GSD) was 
transposed into Swedish law through amendments to the law on natural gas (Bet. 
2005/06:NU18). These amendments were adopted together with a series of proposals to 
strengthen the consumers on the Swedish market for energy (Prop. 2005/06:158). Thus the 
transposition is performed within the context of a wider energy issue not entirely related to 
EU policy, a context transposition process.   
5.6.2 The	  railway	  working-­‐time	  directive	  (RWT)	  
The Council directive 2005/47/EC on working conditions for mobile workers in cross-border 
services in the railway sector (RWT) was adopted on the 18th of July 2005, with the 
transposition deadline set to the 27th of July 2008. The directive was transposed into Swedish 
law as a new law (SFS 2008:475), which entered into force on the 14th of December 2008. 
                                                
43 Council directives 2001/86/EC and 2003/72/EC 
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The government bill was solely constructed to transpose the directive, which is also true for 
the corresponding parliament committee report (Prop. 2007/08:76).  
5.6.3 H4-­‐H6:	  Political	  conflict	  –	  Level,	  visibility	  and	  timing	  
GSD 
The committee report on the government bill for the GSD stated that the parliament should 
vote to accept the government proposal on natural gas and to dismiss eleven of MEP counter 
proposals to the bill. The full committee report included 15 reservations of which three are 
related the GSD (Bet. 2005/06:NU18). These three reservations back a series of proposals 
about (e.g.) whether to expand the grid for natural gas in Sweden (Bet. 2005/06:NU18).  
 
Thus there are some political conflict surrounding the directive and the government bill. 
However, this conflict does not refer directly the transposition of the GSD and the directive is 
not mentioned in the related parliamentary debate (Protokoll 2005/06:134). This state of little 
conflict is corroborated by the fact that only one party had any comments in the EU 
committee prior to the adoption of the directive, and that no visible discussion about the 
directive are seen in Swedish media44 (EUN 2003/04:13).  
 
Despite the low level of conflict, the little conflict that there has been over the directive has 
been present in the transposition process and preceded its finalisation. Examples of this is 
related reservations in the committee report as well as raised doubt over the content of the 
directive in the EU committee’s debates (Bet. 2005/07:NU18; EUN 2003/04:13).  
 
RWT 
The committee report that proposed that the parliament should accept the government bill 
transposing the RWT also included two reservations from one party respectively. These 
reservations concern (1) the definition of night work, (2) which workers that should be 
affected by the directive and (3) how many resting periods that can be located outside of the 
workers home in a row (Bet. 2007/08:TU9). Even though these reservations deal with minor 
issues while agreeing to the transposition in general, the proposed changes concern central 
aspects of the bill. Furthermore, other political actors outside of the parliament such as 
employers’ organisations and trade unions back these opinions (Prop. 2007/08:76).  
                                                
44 Mediearkivet was used to look for media attention (http://www.retriever-info.com/)  
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The conflict regarding the issues mentioned above is clearly visible in the transposition 
process, including comments from the labour market parties in the preparatory referral 
process as well as in the committee report and parliament debate (Prop. 2007/08:76; Bet. 
2007/08:TU9; Protokoll 2007/08:111). There is also some media attention regarding the 
directive (Belin et al 2009). While this debate is about the renegotiation of the directive rather 
than the transposition itself (and thus does not precede the transposition process) it echoes the 
political conflict that was present in the parliamentary process.  
5.6.4 H7:	  Timing	  and	  correctness	  
Both of the directives where transposed after the deadline set by the council. The legal act 
transposing the GSD entered into force just short of two months after deadline. While the 
transposing legal act of the RWT entered into force at the deadline set by the council, its 
provisions was not applied until five months later. This could be compared to the mean delay 
of the directives in the sample which is 2,3 months45. The delay of the RWT is however 
mentioned already in the government bill, and is argued to be set intentionally to synchronise 
it with changes in other related rules (Prop. 2007/08:76).  
 
The delay regarding the GSD was noticed and commented by the commission in 2006 (Skr. 
2006/07:85). The commission has not commented the delay of the RWT during the years 
following its transposition46. However, neither of the two directives have been the object of a 
formal infringement procedure regarding the Swedish transposition. The EU wide 
transposition of both the directives have however been analysed in one commission report 
respectively, following the monitoring provisions stated in the directives (COM(2008) 769 
final; COM(2008) 769 final).  
 
The commission have not pursued any infringement procedure regarding the transposition of 
the GSD in any MS. The available commission reports, on the transposition and 
implementation of the directive, don’t highlight any specific non-compliance to the directive 
in any country (COM(2008) 769 final; SEC(2009) 978). However, these reports do not 
                                                
45 Which is also close to the median delay of about 60 days in the sample of Haverland (et al 2011).  
46 This and following statements about infringement procedures have been established by searching for the directives in the 
Swedish governments´ annual reports on EU affairs, covering the years 2000-2013, as well as linked documents to each 
directive in the Eurlex database (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html) 
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include any such attempts but rather assesses the impact of the directive and is thus not 
satisfying evidence alone to suggest whether the Swedish transposition is correct or not. The 
fact that Sweden seems to have transposed the directive correctly is further corroborated 
though, by a comparison of the Swedish transposition measures and the legal text of the 
directive (SNBT [no date b]; Prop. 2005/06:158; SFS 2006:1043) 
 
The commission report on transposition of the RWT does not report any violations against the 
directive in any of the MSs (COM(2012) 627 final). Furthermore, the commission have not 
pursued more than four infringement procedures regarding the directive, all because of non-
notification. Sweden is furthermore mentioned, in another commission report, as one of eight 
MSs that had transposed the RWT in full, while the 17 remaining had failed to transpose 
correctly or to notify the commission (COM(2008) 855). A comparison between the 
transposing measures and the directive further strengthens the evidence in favour of the 
Swedish transposition being correct (SNBT [no date c]; Prop. 2007/08:76).  
5.6.5 Conclusion	  from	  the	  process	  tracing	  
The two directives that have been most thoroughly analysed in this thesis share some 
similarities. First, both of them are transposed late. Since these directives are left when 
alternative reasons for late/wrong transposition have been eliminated, it is reasonable to 
believe that this has to do with the level of political conflict. However, while the GSD is not 
an object of any strong political opposition it is still late. An alternative explanation for the 
delay is then that the parliamentary process in itself delays transposition.  
 
The delay regarding the RWT on the other hand, was longer and the transposition suffered 
some opposition. Furthermore, this opposition was part of the transposition and preceded the 
parliamentary debates. This strengthens hypotheses 4-6. The clearly stated reason for the 
application delay (section 5.5.4) though, weakens the validity of this interpretation 
significantly.  
 
The fact that none of the directives seems to have been transposed wrong further weakens 
evidence that political conflict hampers transposition (in the two cases). However, it is 
important to note that the correctness of these directives require further analysis to be finally 
deemed as fulfilled. 
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6 Concluding	  discussion	  
This thesis has dealt with the overarching question why compliance records in the MSs of the 
EU vary across policy-sectors. The focus of the analysis has been to test whether political 
conflict cause transposition failures and if the division between commission and council 
directives can serve as a proxy for political conflict. The thesis quite confidently strengthens 
the expectation that political conflict in the MSs can cause non-compliance. It furthermore 
demonstrates that commission directives generally cause less conflict in the chosen sectors 
than council directives. However the thesis fails to unfold the causal mechanisms by which 
this relationship works. 
6.1 To	  what	  extent	  does	  the	  division	  between	  commission	  and	  council	  directives	  
serve	  as	  a	  good	  proxy	  for	  the	  level	  of	  political	  conflict	  over	  directives?	  
The expectation of Haverland et al (2011) and Börzel & Knoll (2014) that council directives 
take more time to be, and more often are inadequately, transposed is founded on the rationale 
that commission directives should cause less political conflict in the MSs. The analysis above 
clearly shows that this expectation, and thus the first hypothesis of the thesis (H1), holds 
when tested in the sample of directives. Higher shares of council directives are transposed as 
acts of law than commission directives, and council directives face significantly more 
reservations in the parliamentary process than commission directives. This is evident from the 
numbers in table 3 (section 5.1) and even more strengthened when considering that at least 
one commission directive47 in the finance sector is transposed as secondary law even though 
in the context of a transposition bundle including acts of law.  
 
The conclusion is further corroborated by the fact that all but one48 of the commission 
directives (transposed as acts of law) are transposed in bundles including at least one council 
(or council/EP) directive, which is the object of any political conflict in these processes. The 
council directives on epizooty, that is not clear examples of secondary law transposition 
however regarded as such above, further strengthens this inference (see section 5.1). 
 
Even though a clear conclusion is well founded, regarding the validity of the 
council/commission division as a proxy for political conflict (in Sweden), some cautionary 
                                                
47 Dir. 2006/73/EC 
48 Dir. 2002/94/EC 
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remarks are needed. This since there is some variation in this result across the analysed policy 
sectors. It is actually only in the enterprise sector where there is any difference in the amount 
of directives transposed as acts of law between commission and council directives. The full 
difference between directives is thus caused by the fact that all council enterprise directives 
where transposed as acts of law, while all of the commission directives in enterprise policy 
where transposed using secondary legislation. While this underlines some caution when 
interpreting the results as causing sector variance, the corroborating factors mentioned above 
offers some certainty to the conclusion that council and commission directives differ 
regarding the level of political conflict.  
 
The fact that political conflict seems to be highest regarding financial matters, medium in 
enterprise policy and least in agricultural policy strengthens this conclusion even more. This 
since that is what was expected according to the inferences in the case selection of the thesis 
(section 4.2). These expectations about distribution of political conflict between policy sectors 
follow from the logic that a sector with less council directives should stir less political 
conflict. It should be noted however that the expectations is not in full congruence with 
previous research. While this does not affect the chosen policy sectors (agriculture policy is 
e.g. indeed seen as less political sensitive than enterprise policy), the expectation that 
environment and social policy should cause little political conflict is rather surprising (see e.g. 
Haverland et al 2011; Angelova et al 2012). Since these sectors are not part of the analysis it 
should however have limited effect on the result of the thesis.  
6.2 How	  is	  correct	  and	  timely	  transposition	  in	  agriculture,	  finance	  and	  enterprise	  
affected	  by	  political	  conflict	  over	  directives	  in	  Sweden?	  
The answer to this research question is reached in two steps. First the analysis of all the 56 
directives reveals that there is a real difference in the share of directives transposed on time 
between processes involving high and low level of political conflict respectively (see section 
5.3-5.5). Secondly, the analysis of the 15 directives transposed as acts of law, and in-depth 
analysis of the GSD and RWT, shows that there are some more evidence that political conflict 
can influence timelines but none that correctness is affected by this factor (see section 5.4).  
 
This discussion starts in the aggregate analysis of the full sample of 56 directives. The initial 
conclusion is that there is a very clear difference, in transposition records, between directives 
that are transposed as acts of law (and thus politically contested) and those that are transposed 
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using only secondary law. While less than half (47 %) of transposition processes involving 
the parliament where finalised in due time, close to four fifths (78 %) of secondary law 
transposition processes met the deadline set by the directives. This clearly strengthens the 
hypothesis (H2) that political conflict can indeed cause transposition failures. Thus the result 
corroborates conclusions from previous scholarly work, that political processes in the MSs are 
an important key for the understanding of compliance variance (e.g. Haverland et al 2011; 
Steunenberg & Rhinard 2010; Thomson 2010).  
 
If the first part of the answer seems clear-cut in support of the hypotheses, that have guided 
the analysis, the second part is more nuanced. The first step of the process-tracing analysis 
however begins to support the conclusion above. The two directives, the GSD and the RWT, 
least likely to have been affected by alternative reasons for non-compliance – and 
correspondingly most likely to have transposition failure caused by political conflict – indeed 
suffered late transposition. However as the analysis proceeds there is some evidence 
weakening the potential for making claims of a causal mechanism being found.   
 
First of all, neither of the two directives where transposed inadequately. Even though some 
doubts about this inference can be raised, it must be concluded that within the scope of this 
thesis compliance seems to have been reached despite political conflict. Secondly, the 
political conflict regarding the GSD was at beast minor and thus less likely to have caused the 
(short) transposition delay. The conflict over the RWT is however more developed and 
backed by other political actors as well as clearly visible in the transposition process from its 
early stages (inquiry process). This seems as good evidence in support of a causal mechanism 
between political conflict and transposition failure. Nevertheless a clear and probable 
alternative explanation is also found within the empirical evidence. Since the delay seems to 
be a conscious choice, motivated early in the transposition process, any claims that the delay 
was due to political conflict seems unreasonable.  
 
The thesis thus fails to establish a causal link between political conflict and non-compliance. 
However it is important to note that the analysis reveals that the hypothesised relationship 
between conflict and compliance is supported on the aggregate level of the analysis. The 
analysis is furthermore performed in a country where this relationship is supposed to be less 
likely than in other parts of the EU (Falkner et al 2005; Sverdrup 2004; Tallberg 1998). This 
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conclusion clearly strengthens reasons to believe that as long as political actors continue to 
question the legitimacy of the EU, non-compliance will persist.  
6.3 Bringing	  the	  questions	  together	  	  
The obvious question that follows from the results presented above is: do council directives 
cause more non-compliance than commission directives? The straightforward answer to this 
question is no. The evidence taken together does not suggest that compliance is better 
regarding commission directives than with council acts. However, if regarding some of the 
qualifications above this answer becomes less confident (see section 5.3.1).  
 
While agricultural policy and enterprise policy follows the theoretical expectations it is within 
finance policy the unexpected result is produced. As noted in the analysis this difference is 
caused, at least to some degree, by the fact that three commission directives are transposed in 
one single transposition process. When further taking into account the fact that political 
conflict regarding commission directives in finance at large seems to be generated by council 
(and EP) directives the picture becomes even more blurred.  
 
It is important to note that the thesis cannot conclude in favour of the hypothesis suggesting 
that commission directives are less prone to cause non-compliance. However the unexpected 
result that compliance seems alike regarding both types of directives is not very clear either. 
This anomaly could be caused simply by the fact that the thesis deals with a relatively small 
sample, chosen strategically. Thus it does not seriously weaken inferences from previous 
research suggesting a relationship between commission directives and less transposition 
failures (e.g. Haverland et al 2011; Toshkov 2010).  
6.4 How	  and	  why	  does	  (non-­‐)	  compliance	  with	  EU-­‐legislation	  vary	  between	  policy-­‐
sectors?	  
Since the overarching research question of the thesis only in part is answered by this thesis 
(due to case selection), and is so by answers to the sub-questions above, it will not be 
discussed at any length here. However some general conclusions regarding the question will 
be stated.  
 
The analysis above reveals that directives regarding financial matters are almost twice as 
often transposed late than directives in agriculture and enterprise policy. While this confirms 
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the theoretically expected third hypothesis (H3) of the thesis, the fact that enterprise policy 
more often (even though just barely) is transposed on time than directives in the agricultural 
sector does the opposite. One answer to the how-question is thus that financial directives are 
less likely to be transposed on time than agriculture and enterprise directives.  
 
As to the why question the section above has dealt with political conflict as a predictor for 
variance at length. While this seems to be one increasingly probable reason for non-
compliance, the thesis fails to demonstrate a clear and explicit causal relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable.  
6.5 Generality	  and	  qualification	  
There are some concerns with the study that needs to be raised. First, there are good reasons 
to assume that transposition measures using only secondary law are subjected to less political 
conflict than those that needs to pass a parliamentary process – thus reaffirming the use of 
type of legislation as a measurement of conflict. However there are further aspects that 
separate acts of law from secondary legislation, and some of these can reasonably affect 
compliance as well. The main aspect of concern is time consumption. The parliamentary 
process generally needs more time to be completed than making of secondary legislation. 
Thus the mere process of making acts of law can delay transposition, regardless of political 
conflict. This is why the thesis has made an attempt to analyse the process deeper, to establish 
the causal link between conflict and non-compliance. Since it has not managed to do so, some 
caution is advisable when interpreting the results.  
 
A second point to make is that the thesis does not use any advanced statistical methods or 
specifically crafted case study statistics such as Quantitative Case Analysis (QCA)49 in its 
analyses. The thesis instead relies on a strategic case selection and qualitative inferences to 
come to its result. The case selection and methods to answer the research questions generate 
some generalizability as to the results of the theory testing, since the cases are chosen to keep 
as many alternative independent variables constant. The choice of Sweden as a least likely 
case furthermore strengthens generalizability, at least to the degree that it is reasonable to 
think that the effect should be present in other MSs as well. However it is important to note 
that inferences that goes beyond the theory testing aim of the thesis is not possible to 
                                                
49 See e.g. Rihoux (2006) for a discussion about QCA, a method crafted to increase generalizability in comparative case 
studies.  
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generalise to a wider population. The statements concerning e.g. how compliance varies 
between sectors are only valid for the sample rather than all policy sectors in Sweden or other 
countries.  
6.6 Remaining	  gaps	  
Given the conclusion of the empirical analyses and the theoretical and methodological 
qualifications of the study some interesting pathways for further research emerges. The 
hesitance regarding type of legislation as a measure of political conflict calls for a 
comparative study where transposition processes of similar directives performed through acts 
of law and secondary legislation respectively should be fruitful. While this path could be 
chosen using either qualitative or quantitative methods, a different direction would be to 
continue in a similar fashion as the latter part of this study. Hence to select some cases where 
the levels of political conflict are high and map the process very thoroughly to try and find a 
causal link between the conflict and non-compliance.  
 
Another direction for further research would be to move back to a large-scale quantitative 
study. It could preferably still be situated in the Swedish context, but involving all directives 
transposed (in a given time period) to test whether commission and council directives can 
explain differences in compliance between sectors at an aggregate level. Yet one suggestion is 
to further examine the agricultural policy sector more in-depth since it constitutes an 
unexpected result in this study.  
 
Whichever way future research will be steered into it is evident that the processes of policy-
making doesn´t stop when decisions are made in Brussels. Policy actors in the MSs still have 
power over MS decision-making and thus transposition of directives. What this study has 
managed to demonstrate is that the opinion of these actors is important for a consensus, on the 
necessity to comply with EU legislation, to be viable. Thus the task to establish legitimacy for 
supranational decisions are paramount for the EU to be able to handle future challenges. Only 
then the EU can prosper as unified in its ever so changing diversity. 
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 8 Appendix	  1:	  List	  of	  directives	  in	  the	  sample	  
Directive Sector  Transposition measure OT Title 
Commission Directive 2002/94/EC Finance SFS 2003:142 Yes of 9 December 2002 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Council Directive 
76/308/EEC on mutual assistance for the recovery of claims relating to certain levies, duties, taxes and other 
measures  
Commission Directive 2003/124/EC 
Commission Directive 2003/125/EC 
Commission Directive 2004/72/EC 
Finance FFFS 2005:7, FFFS 2005:8, FFFS 
2005:9, SFS 2005:377-2005:387, 
SFS 2005:485  
No 1. of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the definition of market manipulation 
2. of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards the fair presentation of investment recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest  
3. of 29 April 2004 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards 
accepted market practices, the definition of inside information in relation to derivatives on commodities, the 
drawing up of lists of insiders, the notification of managers' transactions and the notification of suspicious 
transactions  
Commission Directive 2006/70/EC 
 
Finance SFS 2009:62, SFS 2009:63-2009:78 No of 1 August 2006 laying down implementing measures for Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council as regards the definition of politically exposed person and the technical criteria for simplified 
customer due diligence procedures and for exemption on grounds of a financial activity conducted on an 
occasional or very limited basis  
Commission Directive 2006/73/EC Finance FFFS 2007:16, FFFS 2007:19, SFS 
2007:528, SFS 2007:572  
Yes of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the 
purposes of that Directive  
Commission Directive 2000/45/EC Agriculture SJVFS 2000:169 Yes of 6 July 2000 establishing Community methods of analysis for the determination of vitamin A, vitamin E and 
tryptophan in feedingstuffs 
Commission Directive 2001/15/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2002:18 Yes of 15 February 2001 on substances that may be added for specific nutritional purposes in foods for particular 
nutritional uses  
Commission Directive 2001/22/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2002:49 Yes of 8 March 2001 laying down the sampling methods and the methods of analysis for the official control of the 
levels of lead, cadmium, mercury and 3-MCPD in foodstuffs  
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Commission Directive 2001/32/EC Agriculture SJVFS 2001:117 No of 8 May 2001 recognising protected zones exposed to particular plant health risks in the Community and 
repealing Directive 92/76/EEC  
Commission Directive 2002/4/EC Agriculture SJVFS 2003:20, LIVSFS 2003:43  Yes of 30 January 2002 on the registration of establishments keeping laying hens, covered by Council Directive 
1999/74/EC  
Commission Directive 2002/16/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2003:2 Yes of 20 February 2002 on the use of certain epoxy derivatives in materials and articles intended to come into 
contact with foodstuffs 
Commission Directive 2002/26/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2002:49 Yes of 13 March 2002 laying down the sampling methods and the methods of analysis for the official control of the 
levels of ochratoxin A in foodstuffs 
Commission Directive 2002/63/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2002:43 Yes of 11 July 2002 establishing Community methods of sampling for the official control of pesticide residues in and 
on products of plant and animal origin and repealing Directive 79/700/EEC 
Commission Directive 2002/67/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2003:6, LIVSFS 2003:7 Yes of 18 July 2002 on the labelling of foodstuffs containing quinine, and of foodstuffs containing caffeine  
Commission Directive 2002/69/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2002:49 Yes of 26 July 2002 laying down the sampling methods and the methods of analysis for the official control of dioxins 
and the determination of dioxin-like PCBs in foodstuffs 
Commission Directive 2002/70/EC Agriculture SJVFS 2003:87 No of 26 July 2002 establishing requirements for the determination of levels of dioxins and dioxin-like PCBs in 
feedingstuffs 
Commission Directive 2003/40/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2003:45 No of 16 May 2003 establishing the list, concentration limits and labelling requirements for the constituents of 
natural mineral waters and the conditions for using ozone-enriched air for the treatment of natural mineral 
waters and spring waters 
Commission Directive 2003/78/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2004:17 Yes of 11 August 2003 laying down the sampling methods and the methods of analysis for the official control of the 
levels of patulin in foodstuffs 
Commission Directive 2003/90/EC Agriculture SJVFS 2004:24 Yes of 6 October 2003 setting out implementing measures for the purposes of Article 7 of Council Directive 
2002/53/EC as regards the characteristics to be covered as a minimum by the examination and the minimum 
conditions for examining certain varieties of agricultural plant species 
Commission Directive 2003/91/EC Agriculture SJVFS 2004:24 Yes of 6 October 2003 setting out implementing measures for the purposes of Article 7 of Council Directive 
2002/55/EC as regards the characteristics to be covered as a minimum by the examination and the minimum 
conditions for examining certain varieties of vegetable species 
Commission Directive 2003/104/EC Agriculture SJVFS 2004:42 No of 12 November 2003 authorising isopropyl ester of the hydroxylated analogue of methionine 
Commission Directive 2003/126/EC Agriculture SJVFS 2004:42 Yes of 23 December 2003 on the analytical method for the determination of constituents of animal origin for the 
official control of feedingstuffs 
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Commission Directive 2004/6/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2004:9 Yes of 20 January 2004 derogating from Directive 2001/15/EC to postpone the application of the prohibition of trade 
to certain products 
Commission Directive 2004/16/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2004:17 Yes of 12 February 2004 laying down the sampling methods and the methods of analysis for the official control of 
the levels of tin in canned foods 
Commission Directive 2004/103/EC Agriculture SJVFS 2005:22 No of 7 October 2004 on identity and plant health checks of plants, plant products or other objects, listed in Part B 
of Annex V to Council Directive 2000/29/EC, which may be carried out at a place other than the point of entry 
into the Community or at a place close by and specifying the conditions related to these checks 
Commission Directive 2004/105/EC Agriculture SJVFS 2005:3 Yes of 15 October 2004 determining the models of official phytosanitary certificates or phytosanitary certificates for 
re-export accompanying plants, plant products or other objects from third countries and listed in Council 
Directive 2000/29/EC 
Commission Directive 2005/26/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2005:15 Yes of 21 March 2005 establishing a list of food ingredients or substances provisionally excluded from Annex IIIa of 
Directive 2000/13/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Commission Directive 2006/141/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2008:2, LIVSFS 2008:3, 
SFS 1995:450, SOSFS 1983:21, 
SOSFS 2008:33 
No of 22 December 2006 on infant formulae and follow-on formulae and amending Directive 1999/21/EC 
Commission Directive 2000/39/EC Enterprise AFS 2000:3 Yes of 8 June 2000 establishing a first list of indicative occupational exposure limit values in implementation of 
Council Directive 98/24/EC on the protection of the health and safety of workers from the risks related to 
chemical agents at work 
Commission Directive 2002/31/EC Enterprise KOVFS 2002:4 Yes of 22 March 2002 implementing Council Directive 92/75/EEC with regard to energy labelling of household air-
conditioners  
Commission Directive 2002/40/EC Enterprise KOVFS 2002:4 Yes of 8 May 2002 implementing Council Directive 92/75/EEC with regard to energy labelling of household electric 
ovens  
Commission Directive 2006/15/EC Enterprise AFS 2005:17, AFS 2007:2 Yes of 7 February 2006 establishing a second list of indicative occupational exposure limit values in implementation 
of Council Directive 98/24/EC and amending Directives 91/322/EEC and 2000/39/EC 
Council Directive 2003/48/EC Finance SFS 2003:1130, SFS 2005:344, 
SFS 2005:345 
Yes of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments 
Council Directive 2003/49/EC Finance SFS 2004:614 No of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between 
associated companies of different Member States 
Council Directive 2003/96/EC Finance SFS 2006:1508, SFS 2006:1512  No of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity 
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Council Directive 2006/112/EC Finance SFS 1994:200, SFS 2006:1031, 
SFS 2006:1293, SFS 2007:1376 
Yes of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax 
Council Directive 2000/29/EC Agriculture SJVFS 2000:147 Yes of 8 May 2000 on protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to 
plants or plant products and against their spread within the Community 
Council Directive 2000/75/EC Agriculture SFS 1999:657, SFS 1999:659, 
SJVFS 1999:102, SJVFS 2002:97-
98 
No of 20 November 2000 laying down specific provisions for the control and eradication of bluetongue 
Council Directive 2001/89/EC Agriculture SFS 1992:1683, SFS 1999:657, 
SFS 1999:659, SJVFS 2002:97-98 
No of 23 October 2001 on Community measures for the control of classical swine fever 
Council Directive 2001/110/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2003:10  Yes of 20 December 2001 relating to honey 
Council Directive 2001/111/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2003:11  Yes of 20 December 2001 relating to certain sugars intended for human consumption 
Council Directive 2001/112/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2003:18  Yes of 20 December 2001 relating to fruit juices and certain similar products intended for human consumption 
Council Directive 2001/113/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2003:17  Yes of 20 December 2001 relating to fruit jams, jellies and marmalades and sweetened chestnut purée intended for 
human consumption 
Council Directive 2001/114/EC Agriculture LIVSFS 2003:16  Yes of 20 December 2001 relating to certain partly or wholly dehydrated preserved milk for human consumption 
Council Directive 2002/60/EC Agriculture SFS 1992:1683, SFS 1999:657, 
SFS 1999:659, SJVFS 1999:102, 
SJVFS 2002:98 
Yes of 27 June 2002 laying down specific provisions for the control of African swine fever and amending Directive 
92/119/EEC as regards Teschen disease and African swine fever 
Council Directive 2002/99/EC Agriculture SJVFS 2004:93 Yes of 16 December 2002 laying down the animal health rules governing the production, processing, distribution and 
introduction of products of animal origin for human consumption 
Council Directive 2003/85/EC Agriculture SFS 1993:1617, SFS 1999:657, 
SJVFS 1999:102, SJVFS 2001:19, 
SJVFS 2002:98 
Yes of 29 September 2003 on Community measures for the control of foot-and-mouth disease repealing Directive 
85/511/EEC and Decisions 89/531/EEC and 91/665/EEC and amending Directive 92/46/EEC 
Council Directive 2004/68/EC Agriculture SJVFS 2006:42 No of 26 April 2004 laying down animal health rules for the importation into and transit through the Community of 
certain live ungulate animals, amending Directives 90/426/EEC and 92/65/EEC and repealing Directive 
72/462/EEC 
Council Directive 2005/94/EC Agriculture SFS 1999:657, SFS 1999:659, 
SJVFS 2006:10, SJVFS 2006:16, 
SJVFS 2007:17, SJVFS 2007:24, 
Yes of 20 December 2005 on Community measures for the control of avian influenza and repealing Directive 
92/40/EEC 
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SJVFS 2007:56 
Council Directive 2006/88/EC Agriculture FIFS 2001:3, SFS 1999:657, SFS 
1999:659, SJVFS 1995:125, SJVFS 
1998:98, SJVFS 2006:15, SJVFS 
2006:16, SJVFS 2008:25  
Yes of 24 October 2006 on animal health requirements for aquaculture animals and products thereof, and on the 
prevention and control of certain diseases in aquatic animals  
Council Directive 2001/86/EC Enterprise SFS 1987:1245, SFS 1996:359, 
SFS 2004:559 
Yes of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of 
employees 
Council Directive 2003/72/EC Enterprise SFS 2006:477, SFS 2006:478, SFS 
2006:479 
Yes of 22 July 2003 supplementing the Statute for a European Cooperative Society with regard to the involvement of 
employees 
Council Directive 2004/67/EC Enterprise SFS 2006:1043, SFS 2006:646  No of 26 April 2004 concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply 
Council Directive 2004/113/EC Enterprise SFS 1915:218, SFS 1991:433, SFS 
1995:584, SFS 2003:307 
Yes of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to 
and supply of goods and services 
Council Directive 2005/47/EC Enterprise SFS 2008:475, SFS 2008:476 No of 18 July 2005 on the Agreement between the Community of European Railways (CER) and the European 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) on certain aspects of the working conditions of mobile workers engaged in 
interoperable cross-border services in the railway sector 
	  
